Analo~es in Spontaneous Discourse I 
Rachel Relc bman 
Harvard University and 
Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc. 
Abstract 
This paper presents an analysis of analogies based on 
observations of oatural conversations. People's 
spontaneous use of analogies provides Inslg~t into their 
implicit evaluation procedures for analogies. The 
treatment here, therefore, reveals aspects of analogical 
processing that is somewhat more difficult to see in an 
experimental context. The work involves explicit 
treatment of the discourse context in which analogy 
occurs. A major focus here is the formalization of the 
effects of analogy on discourse development. There is 
much rule-llke behavior in this process, both in 
underlying thematic development of the discourse and in 
the surface lir~ulstlc forms used in this development. 
Both these forms of regular behavior are discussed in 
terms of a hierarchical structurin6 of a discourse into 
distinct, but related and linked, context spaces. 
1 Introduction 
People's use of analogies in conversation reveals a rich 
set of processing strategies. Consider the following 
example. 
A: 
B: 
C: 
I. I think if you're going to marry someone in the 
2. Hindu tradition, you have to - Well, you - They 
3. say you give money to the family, to the glrl, 
4. but in essence, you actually buy her. 
5. It's the same in the Western tradition. You 
6. know, you see these greasy fat millionaires going 
7. around with film stars, right? They've 
8. essentially bought them by their status (?money). 
9. HO, but, there, the woman is selllng herself. 
10. In these societies, the woman isn't selling 
11. herself, her parents are selling her. 
There are several interesting things happening in this 
exchange. For example, notice that the analogy is argued 
and discussed by the conversants, and that in the 
arEumentatlon C uses the close discourse deictlo "these" 
tO refer to the in~tlatlng subject of the a~alogy, and 
that she uses the far discourse delctlo "there" to refer 
to the linearly closer analogous utterances. In 
addition, notice that C bases her rejection ca a non- 
correspondence of relations effectlng the relation 
claimed constant between the two domains (women hei~ 
sold). She does not simply pick any arbitrary non- 
correspondence between the two domains. In the body of 
this paper, I address and develop these types of 
phenomena accompanying analogies in naturally ongoing 
discourse. 
The body of the paper is divided into four sections. 
First a theoretic framework for discourse is presented. 
This is followed by some theoretic work on analo~es, an 
integration of this work with the general theory of 
discourse proposed here, and an illuntratlon of how the 
II would llke to thank Dedre Gentner for many useful 
comments end discussions. 
integration of the different approaches explicates the 
issues under discussion. In the last section of the 
paper, I concentrate on some surface llngulstlo phenomena 
accompanying a oonversant's use of analogy in spontaneous 
discourse. 
2 The Context Space Theory of Discourse 
A close analysis of spontaneous dialogues reveals that 
discourse processing is focused and enabled by a 
conversant's ability to locate ~ single frame of 
reference \[19, 15, 16\] for the discussion. In effective 
communication, listeners are able to identify such a 
frame of reference by partitioning discourse utterances 
into a hierarchical organization of distinct but related 
and linked context snaces. At any given point, only some 
of these context spaces are in the foreground of 
discourse. Foreg~ounded context spaces provide the 
~eeded reference frame for subsequent discussion. 
An abstract process model of discourse 
generation/interpretation incorporatlng a hierarchical 
view of discourse has been designed using the formalism 
of an Augmented Transition Network (ATN) \[29\] 2 . The 
~Ta~r encoding the context space theory \[20, 22\] views 
a conversation as a sequence of conversatlooal moves. 
Conversational moves correspond to a speaker's 
communioatlve goal vis-A-vis a particular preceding 
section of discourse. Among the types of conversational 
moves - speaker communicative goals - formalized in the 
grammar are: Challenge, Support, Future-Generallzation, 
and Further-Development. 
The correlation between a speakerPs utterances and a 
speaker's communicative goal in the context space grammar 
is somewhat s~m~lar to a theory of speech acts A la 
Austin, Searle, and Grloe \[I, 2q, 9\]. As in the speech 
act theory, a speaker's conversatloral move is recognized 
as a functional communicative act \[q\] with an associated 
set of preconditions, effects, and mode of fulfillment. 
However, in the context space approach, the acts 
recognlzed are specific to maxlm-abldlng thematic 
conversational development, and their preconditions and 
effects stem from the discourse structure (rather than 
from/on arbitrary states in the external world). 
All utterances that serve the fulfillment of a slng~le 
communicative goal are partitloned into a single 
discourse unit - called a context space. A context space 
characterizes the role that its various parts play In the 
overall discourse structure and it explicates features 
relevant to "well-formedness" and "maxim-abiding" 
discourse development. ~ine types of context spaces have 
been formalized in the grammar representing the different 
constituent types of a discourse. The spaces are 
characterized in much the same way as elements of a 
• Systemic Grammar" A la Halllday \[10\] via attributes 
represented as "slots" per Minsky \[I~\]. All context 
spaces have slots for the followlng elements: 
2The rules incorporated in the grammar by themselves do 
not form a complete system of discourse 
generation/inter pretatlon. Rather, they enable 
specification of a set of high level Semantlc/log~Ical 
constraints that a surface lln~istlc from has to meet in 
order to fill a certain maxlm-abidlng conversational role 
at a given point in the discourse. 
63 
o a propositional representation of the set of 
functionally related utterances said to iie An 
the space; 
o the communicative goal served by the space; 
o a marker reflecting the influential status of 
the space at any given point in the discourse; 
o links to preceding context spaces in relatlon to 
which this context space wan developed; 
o specification at the relations involved. 
An equally important feature of a context space are its 
slots that hold the inferred components needed to 
recognize the communicative goal that the space serves in 
the discourse context. There are various ways to fulfill 
a given communicative goal, and usually, dependent on the 
mode of fulfillment and the goal in question, one can 
characterize a set of standardized implicit components 
that need to be inferred. For example, as noted by 
investigators of argumentation (e.g., \[~, 23, 5, 22\]), 
in interpreting a proposition as supporting another, we 
often need to infer some sot of mappings between an 
Interred generic principle of support, the stated 
proposition of support, and the claim being supported. 
We must also infer some general rule of inference that 
allows for conclusion a claim given the explicit 
statements of support and these inferred components. 
Reflecting this standardization of inferential 
elaborations, I have oategorlzed dlfferent types of 
context spaces based on communicative goal and method 
fttlftllment charaeterlzatlons (i.e., specification of 
specific slots needed to hold the standardized 
inferential elaboratlons particular tO a g~Lven goal and 
mode of fulfillment). Dellneatioo of context spaces, 
then, is functlomally based, and in the context space 
grammar, ImplAclt components of a move are treated an 
much a part of the discourse as those components verbally 
expressed. 
3 The Analogy Conversational Move 
Znterpretlng/understanding an analogy obviously involves 
some inferenoing ca the part of a listener. An analogous 
context space, therefore, has some slots particular to 
it. The grammar's characterization of an analogous 
context space is derivative from its for~uLl analysis of 
an analogy oonversatlom-l move. 
3.1 The Structure-Happing Approach 
Identification of those aspects of knowledge considered 
important in analogy seems to be of major cavern in 
current Investlgatlon of this cognitive task 
(e.g., \[2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 18, 25, 28\]). 
GentnerJs ~ theory \[6, 7, 8\] seems most 
compatlble with the findings of the context space 
approach. Gentner argues that analogies aa-e based on an 
implicit understanding that "identical operations and 
relationships hol~ among non identical things. The 
relational structure is preserved, hut not the 
objects" \[8, p.~\]. 
Gentner's analysis can be used to explain B's analogy 
between the Hindu and Western traditions in Excerpt I. 
The relation ~ BUYING WOMAN. FOR $0~ COMPANION FUNCTION 
is held constant between the two doma/ns, and the 
appropriateness Of the analogy iS not affected, for 
instance, hy the noncorrespondlng political views and/or 
religions of the two societies. 
While Gentner cuts down on the number of correspondences 
that must exist between two domains for an analogy to be 
considered good, she still leaves open a rather wide set 
o£ relations that must seemingly be matched between a 
base and target domain. We need some. way to further 
characterize Just those relations that must be mapped. 
For example, the relation TRADING WITH CHINA is totally 
irrelevant to the Hindu-Western analogy in this discourse 
context. As noted by Lakoff & Johnson \[12\], metaphors 
simultaneously "highlight" and "hide" aspects of the two 
domains being mapped onto each other. The context space 
theory supplements both Lakoff & Johnson's analysis and 
the structure-mapplng approach in its ability to provide 
relevant relation characterization.. 
3.2 The Context Space Approach 
In the context space theory, three elements are 
considered vital to analogy evaluation: 
o the structure mapping theory 
o relevant context identification 
o communicative goal identification 
The context space grammar's analysis of analogies can be 
characterized by the following: 
Explicating the connection between an utterance 
purportlng to make a claim analogous to another rests on 
recoghizlng that fc~. two propositions to be analogous, it 
anst be the cnse that they can bo ~h be seen an ~nstanc,s 
Of some more general claim, such that the predicates of 
all three propositions are identloal (i.e., relation 
identity), and the correspondent objects of the two 
domains involved are both subsets of some larger sot 
specified in this more general claim. 
Rejecting an analogy is based on specifylng some 
relation, RI, of one domain, that one implies (or claims) 
is not true in the other; or is based on specifying some 
non-ldentloal attrlbute-value pair ~'om whloh such a 
relation, RI, can be inferred. In both cases, RI oust 
itself stand in a 'CAUSE' relation (or soma other such 
relatlon 3) with one Of the relations explicitly mentioned 
in the creation of the analogy (i.e., one being held 
constant between the two domains, that we csul call RC). 
Furthermore, it must be the cnse that the communicative 
goal of the analogy hinges on RI(RC) being true (or not 
true) in both of the domains. 
3.3 A-alogous Context Spaces 
Re£1ectlng this analysis of ~--!o~Les, all analogous 
context spaces have the followlng slot deflnltlons (among 
others). 
Abstract: This slot contains the generic 
proposltlon, P, of which the Inltlatlng 
and analogous claim are instances. 
Reflecting the fact that the same 
predication must be true of both cla.lms, 
3Since aceordin~ to this analysis the prime focal point 
of the analogy is always the relations (i.e., "actions") 
being held constant, and a major aspect of an "action" is 
its cause (reason, intent, or effect of occurrence), a 
non~orrespondenoe in one of these relations will usually 
invalidate the point at the analogy. 
64 
Relations: 
Proposition: 
Mappings: 
the predicate in the abstract slot is 
fixed; other elements of the abstract are 
variables corresponding to the abstracted 
clansea of which the specific elements 
mentionod in the analogous and initiating 
clalms are members. The structure of 
this slot, reflecting this importance of 
relation identity, consists of two 
subslots: 
This slot contains a llst of the 
relations that are constant and true in 
the two domains. 
This slot contains the generic 
proposition defined in terms of the 
constant predicates and their variable 
role fillers. 
This slot contains a llst of lists, where 
each llst corresponds to a variable of 
the generic proposition, P, and the 
m-ppings of the objects of the domain 
specified in the initiating context space 
onto the objects specified in the 
analogous context space. 
3.~ Communicative Goals Served by Analogies 
An analogY conversational move can carve in fulfillment 
of a number of different communicative goals. Major 
roles currently identified are: 
I. Means of Explanation 
2. Means of Support 
3- Means of Implicit Judgement (i.e., conveying an 
evaluative opinion on a given state-of-a/falrs 
by comparing it to a situation for which 
opinion, either positive or negative, is 
assumed generally shared) 
4. Topic ShiSt by Contrast 
5. Hemna for Future-GeneraLizatlon 
~n maxlm-abldlng discourse, only elements felt to be 
directly analogous cr contrastlve to elements contained 
in the Inltiat~ng context space are discussed in the 
analogous space". Analogy construction entails a local 
shift in toplo, and, therefore, in general, a/tar 
discussion of the analogous space (iscluding its 
component parts, such as "supports-of," "challenges-of,, 
etc.), we have immediate resumption of the initiating 
context space. (When analogies are used for goals ~ & 5 
noted above, if the analogy is accepted, then there need 
not be a return to the initiating space.) 
3.5 Illuetratlon 
In this section, I present an analysis of an excerpt in 
which convereants spontaneously generate and argue about 
analog~les. The analysis hiEhlights the efficacy of 
inteKratlng the structure napping approach with r~e 
communicative gnal directed approach of the context space 
theory. The excerpt also illustrates the rule-llke 
behavior governing continued thematic development of a 
discourse after an analogy is given. 
Excerpt 2 is taken from a taped conversation between two 
friends, M and N, wherein M, a British citizen, is trying 
to explain to H, an American, the history cf the current 
turmoil in Ireland. The conversational moves involved in 
the excerpt (A & D being of the same category) are the 
following: 
A: ADalogy 
B: Challenge of Analogy 
C: Defense of A~alogy 
D: Alternate Aralogy 
E: Return to the initiating context space of the 
analogy; with the return belng in the form of a 
"Further-Development" (as signalled by the clue 
"sow"). 
H: 
N: 
M: 
N. 
M: 
N: 
M: 
N: 
M: 
N: 
I. And, of course, what's made it worse this tima 
2. is the British army moving in. And, moving in, 
3. in the first place, as a police force. It's 
4. almost a Vietnam, in a way. 
5. But, all within Northern Ireland? 
6. All within Northern Ireland. Moving in as a 
7. police force, belng seen by everybody as a 
8. police force that was going to favor the 
9. Protestants. 
10. It'd rather be llke Syria being in Lebanon, 
11. rlght? 
12. I don't know enough about it to know, maybe. 
13. There's - Where, there's a foreign police force 
I~. in one country. I mean, when you say it's llke 
15. Vietnam, I can't take Vietnam. Vietnam is North 
16. Vietnam and South Vietnam. 
17. No, I meant war. You know, moving in and sayln6 
18o we're a police action and actually flg~ting a war 
19. when you got there. 
20. Oh, well, that's Syria, that's obviously Syria, 
21. rlght? Who are implicitly supporting - not 
22. supportlng - 'cause actually it's very similar 
23. in Lebanon, right? You have the Catholics and 
2~. the Moslem. That's right, that's Lebanon. 
25. I suppose, yes. 
26. You have the Catholics and the Moslem, and then 
27. Syria's eomlng in and implicitly supporting the 
28. Moslem, because Syria itself is Moslem. 
29. Now, England is Protestant? 
qOf course, 
digressions. 
this does not preclude explicitly noted 
65 
3.5.1 Analysis 
We ~an begin the analysis with a more formal 
chaFaoterlzatlon of M's analogy conversational move. 
The generic proposition underlying N's analogy: 
$Countryl 81 $Country2 
$Countryl R2 NEthnioGroup2 
Where, the constant relations are: 
R1: MOVE-IN-AS-~OLICE-FORCE 
H2: TAKE-SIDE-OF 
The objects sapped onto each other: 
Mappings1: England, America 
Mappings2: Ireland, Vietnam 
Mapping=S: Protestants, South Viet~amese 
The communicative goal served by the analogy: 
Negative Evaluation on England 
In rejection of the analogy, N claims that in the Vietnam 
case alone the following three relations occur: 
R3: FOREIGN INVASION 
Rq: AID AGAINST FOREIGN INVASION 
RS: CAUSE 
Where, R5 la a relation between relations, i.e., 83 CAUSE a~ 5 . 
The purpose of M's analogy is to hig~llght her negative 
assessment of England in the Ireland altuatlon (as 
identified by her utterance, "And, whatOs made it worse 
this tlme ..."). M attempts to accomplish this by 
mapplng the presummed acknowledged negative assessment of 
America in Vietnam onto England. Such a negative 
evaluative ~apping, however, can only occur of course if 
one oondenns America's involvement in Vietnam. N denies 
such a presummed negativity by arguing that it is 
possible to view America's involvement in Vietnam a~ 
coming to the aid of a country under foreign attack ~ 
(i.e., as a positive rather than a negative act). 
Thus, argues N, the "cause" relations of the acts being 
held constant between the two domain~ (i.e., enteran~e as 
a police force but being partisan) are quite different in 
the two cases. And, in the Vietnam case, the cause of 
the act obviates any common negativity associated with 
such "unfair police force treatment." There is no 
negativity of America to map onto England, and the whole 
purpose of the analogy has failed. Hence, according to 
5Rq can be thought of as another way of loo~.ing at R1 
and R2. Alternatively, it could be thought of as 
replacing RI and R2, since when one country invades 
another, we do ~ot usually co~slder third party 
intervention as mere "coming in as a polio= force and 
taklng the slde of," but rather as an entrance into an 
ongoing war. However, I think in one light one oen view 
the relations of 81 and R2 holding in either an internal 
or external war. 
6Most criticisms of America's involvement in Vietnam 
rest on viewing it as an act of intervention in the 
internal affairs of a country agalnst the will of half oE 
its people. 
H, the analogy in thls discourse context is vacuous an~ 
warrants rejectlon 7. 
After N's rejection o~ M'e analogy, and N's offering o~" 
an alternative analogy , which is somewhat accepted by M ~ 
as predicted by the gr--~r's analysis of an analogy 
conversational move u~ed for purposes or 
evaluatlon/Justlficatlon, it is time to have ~he 
initiating subject of the analogy returned-to (i.e., i~ 
is time to return to the subject of Br~Italn's moving into 
Ireland) 
The return, on Line 28, in the for= of "Further- 
Development," constitutes a subordinating shaft ~rom 
dlsoussion of ~e event of the British a~my entering 
Ireland onto dlsousslon of England's underlying 
mot~ivatlons and reasons for engaging in this event. 
The form of return illustrates Lakoff & Johnson's notion 
of a metaphor creating new meanlngs for u~, and its 
ability to "induce new similarities" \[12\]. That is, it 
exemplifies a conversant's attempt to map new knowledge 
onto pre-existing knowledge of a domain based upon, and 
induced by, an analogy ,,,de to this domain. An 
appropriate extended paraphrase= of N's question on Line 
28 is: "Okay, so we accept Syria's presence in Lebanon 
as a better analogy for England's presence in Ireland. 
Now, we know, or have Just shown that Syria's bias to the 
Moslems can be explained by the fact that Syria herself 
is Moslem. It has been stated that England, in a sinMilar 
sltuatl~R , is favoring Protestants. can we then carry 
• otlves'" over as well in the analogy? That is, can we 
then infer that England is Favoring the Protestants 
because she is Protestant?" 
7In a different context, perhaps, i.e., had the analogy 
been cited for a different purpose, N may have accepted 
it. In addition, it is iaportant to recognize ~at 
though there are mmerous o~her non-correspondences 
between the Amlrioan-Vletnam and England-L-=land 
situations (e.g., the respective geographlc distances 
involved), N's randoa selection of any one of these other 
nonnorresponding relations (irrespective of thelr 
complexlty) would not have necessarily led to effeotlve 
communication or a reason to reject the analogy. 
8N'= citing of this alternative analogy is supportive 
of the grammar's analysis that the purpose of an analogy 
is vital to Its acceptance, slope, it happens that N 
views Syria's intervention in Lebanon quite negatively: 
thus, her cho£ce of this domain where (An her view) is=re 
is plenty of negativity to ~p. 
9Notice, by the way, that in tsr'~a of "at~ribute 
identity," Amities is a =mob closer latch to England than 
Syria la. This example supports the theory that 
"attribute identity" play= a milLimal role in analogy 
~appings. 
10The fact that M attempts to map a "cause" relation 
between the two domains, further supports the theory that 
it is correspondence of sohesatizatlon or relations 
between dosmins, rather than object identity, that is a 
governing criteria in analogy construction and 
evaluation. 
66 
Surface Lingulstlc Phenomena 
The rules of reference encoded in the context space 
grammar do not complement traditional pronominallzatlon 
theories which are based on criteria of recency and 
resulting potential semantic amblguities. Rather, the 
rules are more in llne with the theory proposed by Olson 
who states that "words designate, signal, or specify an 
intended referent relative to the set of alternatives 
from which it must be differentiated" \[17, p.26~\]. The 
context space grammar is able to delineate this set of 
alternatives governlng a speaker's choice (and listener's 
resolution) of a referring expresslon ;I by continually 
updating its model of the discourse based on its 
knowledge of the effects associated with different types 
of conversational moves. 
Its rule of reference, relevant to current discussion, 
is: 
Only elements in a currently active and 
controlling context space pair are in the set of 
alternatives vying for pronominal and close 
delctic referring expressions. 
The context space grammar continually updates its model 
of the discourse so that at any given point it knows 
which preceding utterances are currently in the active 
and controlling context spaces. Discourse model updating 
is governed by the effects of a conversational move. 
Major effects of most conversational moves are: 
o changes to the influential statuses of preceding 
context spaces; 
changes to focus level assignments of 
constituents of the utterances contained in 
these Spaces; 
o establlshment of new context spaces; 
the creation of outstanding discourse 
expectations corresponding to likely subsequent 
conversational moves. 
The effects of initiating an analogy conversational move 
are to: 
put the initiating context space in a 
Controllln~ state (denoting its foreground role 
during the processing of the analogous space); 
o create a new Active context space to contain the 
forthcoming analogous utterances; 
create the discourse expectation that upon 
completion of the analogy, discussion of the 
initiating context space will be resummed 
(except in cases of communicative goals q and 5 
noted above). 
Endin~ an analogy conversational move, makes available to 
the grammar the "Resume-lnitlatlng" discourse 
expectation, created when the analogy was first 
generated. The effects of choosing this discourse 
expactation are to: 
11Lacking from thls theory, however, but hopefully to 
be included at a later date, is Webber's notion of evoked 
entities \[27\] (i.e., entities not previously mentioned in 
the discourse but which are derivative from it - 
especially, quantified sets). 
67 
o Close the analogous context space (denoting that 
the space no longer plays a foreground discourse 
role); 
o reinstantlate the initiating context space as 
Active. 
Excerpt 3 illustrates how the grammar's rule of reference 
and its updating actions for analo@les explain some 
seeming surprising surface linguistic forms used after an 
analo~ in the discourse. The excerpt is taken from an 
informal conversation between two friends. In the 
discussion, G is explaining to J the workings of a 
particle accelerator. Under current discussion is the 
cavity of the accelerator through which protons are sent 
and accelerated. Particular attention should be given to 
G's referring expressions on Line 8 of the excerpt. 
Excerot 
G: 
j. 
G: 
j. 
G: 
I. It's just a pure electrostatic field, which, 
2. between two points, and the proton accelerates 
3. through the electrostatic potential. 
~. Okay. 
5. Same physical law as if you drop a ball. It 
6. accelerates through a gravitational potential. 
7. Okay. 
8: And the only important point here is that 
9. the potential is maintained with this 
10. Cockcroft-Walton unit. 
Lines 1 - 3: 
Lines 5 - 6 : 
Lines 8 - 10: 
Context Space CI, The Initiating ~pace. 
Context Space C2, The Analogous Space. 
Context Space CI, The Resumption. 
On Line 9, G refers to the "electrostatic potential" last 
mentioned on Line 3. with the unmodified, close deictlc 
referring expression 12 "the potential," despite the fact 
that lntervening~ty on Line 5 he had referenced 
• gravitational potential," a potential semantic 
contender for the unmodified noun phrase. In addition, G 
uses the close delctic "here" to refer to context space 
CI, though in terms of linear order, context space C2, 
the analogous context space, is the closer context space. 
Both these surface linguistic phenomena are explainable 
and predictable by the context space theory. Line 8 
fulfills the discourse expectation of resummlr~ 
discussion of the initiating context space of the 
analogy. As noted, the effects of such a move are to 
close the analogous context space (here, C2) and to 
reassign the initiating space (here, CI) an active 
status. As noted, only elements of an active or 
controlling context space are viable contenders for 
pronominal and close deictlc references; elements of 
closed context spaces are not. Hence, despite criteria 
of recency and resulting potentials of semantic 
ambiguity, G's references unambiguously refer to elements 
of CI, the active foregrounded context space in the 
discourse model. 
As a second example of speakers ualng close deictlcs to 
refer to elements of the initiating context space of an 
analogy, and corresponding use of far deictics for 
elements of the analogous space, lets re-consider Excerpt 
1, repeated below. 
12Th e grammar considers nThe X" a close deictlc 
reference as it is often used as a comple~ment to "That 
X," a clear far deictic expression \[21\] 
A: 
B: 
C: 
I. I think if you're going to marry someone in the 
2. Hindu tradition, you have to - Well, you -They 
3. say you give money to the family, to the glrl, 
q. but in essence, you actually ~uy her. 
5. It's the same in the Western tradition. You 
6. know, you see these greasy fat millionaires going 
7. around with ~ilm stars, right? They've 
8. essentially bought them by their status (?money). 
9. No, but, there, the women is selling herself. 
10. In these societies, the woman isn't selling 
11. herself, her parents are selling her. 
Lines ; - 5: Context Space CI, The Initiating Space. 
Lines 5 - 8: Context Space C3, The Analogous Space. 
LAnes 9 - 11: Context Space C3, The Challenge Space. 
On Line 9, C rejects B's analogy (as signalled by her use 
Of the clue words, "t~o, but") by citing a 
nonoorrespondence of relations between the two domains. 
Notice that in the rejection, C uses the far daictic 
• there = to refer to an element of the linearly close 
analogous context space, C2,t3 and that she uses the 
clone de~ctlc "these" to refer to an 1~lement~ of the 
linearly far initiating context space, CI . 
The grnmm"r models C's move on Line 9 by processing the 
• Challenge- Analogy-Hap plngs" (CAM) conversational move 
defined in its discourse network. This move is a 
subcategory of the grammar' s Challenge move category. 
Since this type of analogy challenge entails contrasting 
constituents of both the initiatlng and analogs context 
spaces'% the grammar must decide which of the two spaces 
should be in a controlling status, i.e., which space 
should serve as the frame of reference for subsequent 
processing. Reflecting the higher influential status of 
the initiating context space, the grammar chooses it as 
its reference frame Is. 
As such, on its transition path for the CAM move, move, 
the gr-mnutr" 
13This conversation was recorded in Switzerland, and in 
terms of a locative use of delctics, Western society is 
the closer rather than Hindu society. Thus, the choice 
of deict£c cannot be explained by appeal to external 
reference criteria. 
1~Notlce, however, that C does not use the close " 
delctlc "here," though it is a better contrastlve term 
with "there" than is =these." The rule of using close 
delctlcs seems to be slightly constrained in that if the 
referent of "here = is a location, and the s~aker is not 
in the location being referenced, then, s/he cannot use 
• here." 
15Zn a different type of analogy challenge, for 
example, one could simply deny the truth of the smalo~us 
utterances. 
16Zn the canes of Pre-Generalizatlon and Topic- 
Contrast-Shlft analogies, it is only after the analogy 
has been accepted that the analogous space is allowed to 
usurp the foreground role of the initiating context 
space. 
O puts the currently active context space (i.e., 
the analogous context space) in a 
state (reflecting its new background role); 
c leaves the initiating space in its Controlling 
state ( I. e., it has been serving as the 
reference frame for the analogy); 
o creates a new Active context space in which to 
put the challenge about to be put forward. 
Performing such u~latlng actions, and using £ts rule that 
only elements in a controlling or active space are viable 
contenders for close delotlc and pronominal references, 
enables the grammar to correctly model, explain, and 
predict C's reference forms on Lines 9 11 of the 
excerpt. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper I have offered a treatment of analogies 
within spontaneous dlalo6ues. In order to do thls I 
first proposed a context space model of discourse. In 
the model discourse utterances are partitioned into 
discrete discourse units based on the communicative goal 
that they serve in the discussion. All communicative 
acts effect the precedlng discourse context and I have 
shown that by tracking these effects the grammar can 
specify a frame of reference for subsequent discussion. 
Then, a structure-~applng approach tO analogies was 
discussed. In this approach it is claimed that the focus 
of an analogy is on system~ of relatlonships between 
objects, rather than on attributes of objects. Analysis 
of naturally occurring analogies supported this claim. I 
then showed that the context space theory's communicative 
goal analysis of discourse enabled the theory to go 
beyond the struoture-mapplng approach by providing a 
further specification of waich klnds of relationships are 
most likely to be Included in description of an analogy. 
• Lastly, Z presented a number of excerpts taken from 
naturally ongoing discourse and showed how the context 
space analysis provided a cogent explanation for the 
types Of analogies found in dlsoouree, the types Of 
reJemt£ons given tO them, the rule-like thematic 
development of a dlsoourse after an a~alogy, and the 
surface llngulstlc forms used in these development. 
In conclusion, analyzing speakers spontaneous generation 
of analogies and other conversants' reaotlons to them, 
provides ua an usually direct form by which access 
individuals' implicit criteria for analogies. These 
exchanges reveal what conversants believe analogies are 
responsible for and thereby what i~ormatlon they need to 
convey. 
68 
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