A PROLEGOMENON TO SITUATION SEMANTICS 
David J. Israel 
Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc. 
Cambridge, MA 02238 
ABSTRACT 
An attempt is made to prepare Computational 
Linguistics for Situation Semantics. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The editors of the AI Journal recently hit upon 
the nice notion of correspondents' columns. The 
basic idea was to solicit experts in various 
fields, both within and outside of Artificial 
Intelligence, to provide "guidance to important, interesting current literature" in their fields. 
For Philosophy, they made the happy choice of Dan Dennett; for natural language processing, the 
equally happy choice of Barbara Grosz. Each has so far contributed one column, and these early 
contributions overlap in one, and as it happens, only one, particular; to wit: Situation~manties. 
Witness Dennett: 
""~ t ~oplcln " Cis\] the hottest new philosophical 
loglc...\[is\] in some ways a successor or 
rival to Montague semantics. 
And now Grosz: 
In recent work, Barwlse and Perry 
address the probZem \[of what information from the context of an utterance affects 
which aspects of interpretation and how?\] 
in the context of a proposed model theory 
of natural language, one that appears to be more compatible with the needs of AI than 
previous theories .... EI\]t is of interest to work in natural-language processing for 
the kind of compositional semantics it ~ 
roposes, and the way in which it allows he contexts in which in an utterance is 
used to affect its interpretation. 
What is all the fuss about? I want to address this question, but rather indirectly. I want to 
situate situation semantics in "conceptual space" and draw some comparisons and contrasts between it 
and accounts in the style of Richard Montague. To 
this end, a few preliminary points are in order. 
A. The Present Situation 
First, as to the state of the Situation Semantics literature. There is as yet no published 
piece of the scope and detail of either "English as 
a Formal Language" or "The Proper Treatment of Ouantlficatlon in Ordinary English". Nor, of 
course, is there anything llke ~hat large body of 
work by philosophers and linguists - computational and otherwise - that has been produced from within 
the Montague paradigm. Montague's work was more or 
hess the first of its kind. It excited, quite justifiably, an extraordinary amount of interest t 
and has already inspired a distinguished body or work, some of it from within AI and Computational 
Linguistics. The latter can hardly be said for 
Situation Semantics (yet?). 
So what is there? Besides a few published 
papers, each of them containing at least one 
position since abandoned~ there is a book ~ Attitudes literally on the very 
verge of publication. This contains the 
philosophlcal/theoretlcal background of the program 
- The Big Picture. It also contains a very brief 
treatment of a very simple fragment of ALIASS. And 
what, the reader may well ask is ALIASS? An Artificial Language for lliustratlng Aspects of 
~Ituation ~emantlcs, that's what. Moreover there is in the works a ceiiaboratlve effort, to be 
called Situations andS. m This will contain 
a "Fragment of Situation Semantics", a treatment of an extended fra~ent of ~. Last, for the 
moment, but not least, is a second book by Barwise 
and Perry, ~ ~, which will include 
a treatment of an even more extended fragment of English, together with a self-contalned treatment 
of the technical, mathematical background. (By 
"self-contalned". understand: not requiring either 
familiarity with or acceptance of The Big Picture ~ 
resented in S&A.) The bottom line: there is very 
Ittle of Situation Semantics presently available 
to the masses of hungry researchers. 
S. 
There are important points of similarity between 
Situation and Montague semantics, of course. One 
is that both are committed to formulating 
mathematically rigorous semantic accounts of English. To this end, both, of course, dip heavily 
into set theory. But this isn't saying a whole 
lot; for they deploy very different set theories. 
Montague, for a variety of technical reasons, was 
very fond of MKM, a very powerful theory, 
countenancing huge collections. MKM allows for both sets and (proper) classes, the latter being 
collections too big to be elements of other 
collections, and too big to be sets, say, of ZF. It also provides an unnervingly powerful 
comprehension axiom. B&P, on the other hand, have 
at least provisionally adopted KPU, a surprisingly weak set theory. Indeed, the vanilla version of 
KPU comes without an axiom of infinity and (more or 
less hence) has a model in the hereditarily finite sets. In that setting, even little infinite 
coliectlons, llke the universe of hereditarily finite sets, are proper classes, and beyond the 
pale. Enough for the moment of set theory, 
although we shall have to return to this strange 
land for one more brief visit. 
More important, and perhaps more disheartening, similarities are immediately to hand. Both 
Montague and B&P - thus far - restrict themselves to the declarative fragment of English; Montague, 
for the obvious reason that he was a model theorist and a student of Tarskl. For such types, the 
crucial notion to be explicated is that of "truth 
mThe collaborators being B&P, Robin Cooper, Hans Kamp, and Stanley Peters. 
28 
of a sentence on an interpretation". Moreover. 
Monta~e showed no interest in the use(s) of 
lar~Euage. Of course people working within his 
tradition are not debarred from doing so; but any 
such interest is an extra added attraction. The same point about model theory, broadly construed, 
holds for Barwlse-Perry as well; they certainly 
aren't syntaeticians. But in their case it is 
reinforced by philosophical considerations which 
point toward the use of language to convey information as the central use of language - hence, 
to assertlng as the central kind of utterance or 
speech act. Thus, even when they narrow their sights to this one use, the notion that language is 
something to be put to various uses by humans to 
further certain of their purposes is not foreign to 
Situation Semantics. • 
Second, B&P (again: so far) stop short at the 
awesome boundary of the period. Here again, this 
was only to be expected; and here again, the 
crucial question is whether their overall philosophical perspective so informs their account 
of natural language as to enable a more fruitful 
accommodation of work on various aspects of 
extended discourse. Barbara Grosz hints at a 
suspicion I share, that although at the moment much of what we have in this regard are promissory notes 
and wishful thinking, the answer is in the affirmative, me 
II THE BIG PICTURE 
The major point, however, concerns the primary 
focus of the work of Barwise and Perry as 
contrasted with that of Montague. Montague 
approached the problem of the semantics of natural language essentially as a model theorist, 
attempting to apply (newly) orthodox mathematical techniques to the solution of classical problems in 
the semantics of natural languages, many of which 
had to do with intensional contexts. After all, 
these new techniques - in the development of which Montague played a role - had precisely to do with 
the treatment of formal languages containing modal 
and other intensional constructions. What made a 
fragment of English of interest to Montague, then, was that it contained loads of such contexts. It 
is as if all of that wondrous machinery, and the technical brilliance to deploy it. were aimed at an 
analysis of the following sentence: While the was ~ ~seemed to be lookln~ 
for ~ unicorn who was thinkinK ~ ~ centaur. 
What is astounding, of course, is that Montague 
should have been able to pull a systematic and rigorous treatment of such contexts out of the 
model-theoretlc hat. 
When we turn to Situation Semantics, on the other hand, we seem to be back in the linguistic 
world of flrst-grade readers: Spot ran. ~ saw ~run. Jane~ that SPot ran. rndee~, t~ 
malor concern of Barwise-Perry is not the semantics 
of natural language at all. They have bigger 
(well, different) fish to fry. First and foremost, 
they are concerned with sketching an account of the 
place of meaning and mind in the universe, an account that finds the source of meaning in nomic 
regularities among kinds of events (sltuatlons)L regularltles which, in general, are independent of 
Aar~uage anu mind. For the frying of said fish, a treatment of cognitive attitudes is essential. 
Moreover, and not independently, for any attempt to 
apply their overall philosophical picture to the 
semantics of natural language, the propositional attitude contexts pose a crucial and seemingly 
I"A Fragment of Situation Semantics, will contain a treatment of certain kinds of English 
interrogatives ; further out in the future, 
Situation ~ will contain such a more extensive treatment. 
eeBreaking out of the straightjacket of the sentence is the job of Situations in Discourse. 
insuperable obstacleo tee Hence the fact that the 
book ~ and Attitudes precedes Situation 
- the first lays the philosophical 
foundations for the second. Thus the origin of 
their concern even with the classical problems of 
the propositional attitudes is different from. though by no means incompatible with, that of 
Montague's. 
Something brief must now be said about ~- big 
picture. Here goes. 
The work of B&P can be seen as part of a 
continuing debate in philosophy about the source of 
the intentlonallty of the mental - and the nature of meaning in general; a debate about the right 
account to give of the phenomenon of one thing or event or state-of-affalrs being able to represent 
(carry information about) another thlr~ or event or 
state-of-affalrs. On one side stand those who see 
the phenomenon of Intentionallty as dependent on 
language - no representation without notation. This 
doctrine is the heart of current orthodoxy in both philosophy of mind and meta-theory of cognitive 
psychology. (See, by way of best example, \[5\]:) 
It is also a doctrine widely thought to oe presupposed b~ the whole endeavor of Artificial 
Intelligence. On another side are those who see 
the representational power of language as itself based on the intentlonallty of mlnd. It The striking 
thing about Barwise and Perry is that, while they 
stand firmly with those who deny that meaning and 
intentlonality essentially involve language, they reject the thesis that intentlonallty and meaning 
are essentlaliy mental or mind-lnvolvlng. 
The source of meaning and intentlonallty is to 
be found, rather, in the existence of lawllke regularities - constraints - among kinds of events. 
For Barwlse-Perry, the analysis of meaning begins 
with such facts as that: smoke means fire or those 
In~t mean measles. The ground of such facts lies e ways of the world; in the regularities 
between event types in virtue of which events of 
one type can carry information about events of 
other types. If semantics is the theory of 
meaning, then there is no pun intended in the application of semantic notions to situations in 
which there is no use of language and, indeed, in 
which there are no minds. 
Meaning's natural home is the world, for meaning arises out of the regular relations 
that hold among situations, among bits of reality. We believe linguistic meaning 
should be seen within this general picture of a world teeming with meaning, a world 
full of information for organisms appropriately attuned to that meaning, tie 
\[3\] 
There is yet another dimension to the philosophical debate, one to which Barwise and 
Perry often allude: 
Some theories stress the power of 
language to classify minds, the mental significance of language, and treat the 
meeI shall return to this theme below. 
JWho knows? Maybe it is. 
eeTheae latter can, in turn, be divided into 
those who seek a naturalistic, in principle physicallst, account and those who, like Frege and 
Church, pose no such demand. 
"eeFor an important philosophical predecessor, see \[~\]. 
29 
classification of (external) events as 
derivative .... A second approach is to focus 
on the external significance of language, 
on its connection with the described world 
rather than the describing mind. Sentences 
are classified not by the ideas they 
express, but by how they describe thlngs to 
be .... Frege adopted a third strategy. He 
postulated a third realm, a realm neither of ideas nor of worldly events, but of 
senses. Senses are the "philosopher's 
stone", the medium that coordinates all 
three elements in our equation: minds, 
words and objects. Hinds grasp senses, 
words express them, and objects are 
referred to by them .... One way of regarding 
the crucial notion of Intension in possible 
world semantlos is a development of Frege's 
notion of sense. \[3\] 
Barwlse and Perry clearly opt for the second 
approach. This is one reason for their concern 
with the problems posed by the propositional 
attitudes; for it has often been argued that these 
contexts doom any attempt at a theory of the second 
type. This is the burden of the dreaded 
"Sllngshot" - a weapon we shall ~aze at later. F?r the moment, though, I want simply to note ~ne 
connection of this dimension with that about the source and nature of intentionality. Just as (some 
particular features of) a particular X-ray carries information about the individual on which the 
machine was trained, e.g., that its leg is broken, 
so too does an utterance by the doctor of the 
sentence "It's bone is broken", in a context in which that same individual is what's referred to by 
• it". One can, of course, learn things about the 
X-ray and the X-ray machine as well as about the ~ 
oor patient; Just so, one can learn thlnEs about 
he doctor from her utterance. In both cases, the ~ 
ainlng of this ~ information is grounded 
n certain regularlties, in the one case 
mechanical, optical and electro-magnetic; in the other, perceptual, cognitive, and social- 
conventional. More to the point, in all cases the 
central locus of meaning is a relation, a 
regularity, between types of situation and the primary focus of significance is an external event 
or event-type. ~ 
Now, alas, for that return to set theory. I 
have studiously avoided telling the reader what 
situations,, events and/or event-~ypes are. Indeed, I haven't even said which, if any, of these are 
technical terms of Situation Semantics. Later I 
shall say enough (I hope) to generate an intuitive feel for situations; still, I have been speaklng 
freely of the centrality of relations between events or between event-types. Set-thecretlcally- 
speaking, such relations are going to be (or be represented by) collections of ordered-palrs. 
C~llections, but not sets. These collections are proper classes relative to KPU; so, if thls be the 
last word on the matter, those very regularities so 
central to the account are not themselves available within the account - that is, they are not 
(represented by) set-theoretic constructs generated from the primitives by way of the resources of ~PU. 
For all such constructs are finite, me 
~eedless to say, that isn't the last word on the 
matter. Still, this is scarcely the place for an extenced treatment of the issue; I raise it here 
simply to drive home a point about that first 
• Needless to say, we can talk about both minds 
and mental events and languages and linguistic 
events~ the key point is simply that a language user is not "really" always talklr~ first and 
foremost about his/her own mental state. We are not doomed to pathologlcal self-lnvolvement by 
being doomed to speak an d think. 
l.Assuming that we stick to an interpretation within the hereditarily finite sets, as we can. 
similarity between Montague and Situation 
Semantics. Montague wanted a very strong 
backEround theory within which models can be 
constructed precisely because he didn't want to 
have to worry about any (size) constraints on such models. B&Pput their money on a very weak set 
theory precisely because they want there to be such 
constraints; in particular because they want to 
erect a certain kind of barrier to the infinite. Obviously, large issues loom on the horizon; let's 
leave them there. 
I want now briefly to discuss 3 major aspects of 
Situation Semantics, aspects in which it differs 
fairly dramatically from Montague semantics. In passing. I will at least j~.. at the 
interrelationships among these, asloe from particular points of difference, remember that in 
the background there lurks a general conception of the use of language and its place in the overall 
scheme of things, a conception that is meant to 
inform and constrain detailed proposals. 
III THE PRINCIPLE OF EFFICIENCY 
One other respect in which Barwise and Perry are 
orthodox is their acceptance of a form of the of , the principle that 
the meaning of a complex expression is a runctlon 
of the meanings of its constituents. This is the 
principle that is supposed to explain the 
proouctivity or generatlvity of languases, and the 
ability of finite creatures to master them. But for Barwise and Perry, an at least equally 
important principle is the Principle ~ .~ Efflciencv of i~." This principle is 
concerned with the ability of different people at different times and places and in different 
contexts to (re)use the self-same sentence to say 
different things - to impart different pieces of 
information. So, to adopt their favorite example. if Mitch now says to me, "You're dead wrong", what 
he says - what he asserts to be the case - is very 
different from what I would say if I were to utter 
the very same sentence directed at him. m" The very 
same sentence is used, "with the same meanir~"; but the message or information carried by its use 
differs. Moreover, the difference is 
systematically related to differences in the 
contexts in which the utterances are made. 
- Barwise and Perry take this phenomenon, often 
called indexlcality or token-reflexlvlty and all 
too often localized to the occurrence of particular 
words (e.g. t I , you , here , now , this , "that"), to oe of the essence of natural languages. 
They also note, however, that their relational account of meaning shows it to be a central feature 
of meaning in general. 
IT\]hat smoke pouring out of the the window over there means that that 
particular building is on fire. Now the 
specific situation, smoke pouring out of 
that very building at that very time, will 
never be repeated. The next time we see 
smoke pouring out a building, it will be a new situation, and so will in one sense 
mean something else. It will mean that the 
building in the new situation is on fire at the new time. Each of these specific smoky 
situations means something, that the 
building then and there is on fire. This is...event meaning. The meaningful 
situations had something in common, the~ 
were of a co~n type, smoke pouring out o~ a building, a type that means fire. This 
is ...event-tYPe meanin~...What a particular case of smoke pouring out of a 
buildlng means, what it tells us about the 
mB&P choose to call such principles "semantic 
universals" - an unhappy choice, I think. 
JeWhlch, of course, ~ would never do. 
30 
wider world, is determined by the meaning 
of smoke pouring out of a building and the 
particulars of this case of it. \[3\] 
Moreover, B&P contend that the fact that modern 
formal semantics grew out of a concern with the 
language(s) of matSematics has caused those working 
within the orthodox model-theoretic tradition 
either to ignore or to slight this crucial 
feature.* 
A preoccupation with the language of 
mathematics, and with the seemingly e6ernal 
nature of its sentences, led the founders 
of our field to neglect the efficiency of 
language. In our opinion this was a 
critical blunder, for efficiency lies at 
the very heart of meaning. \[3\] 
A. A Little Background 
Sure enough, indexicallty gave nightmares to 
both Frege and Russell.** It might seem that the 
issue of indexicality did not escape Montague's 
attention; and it didn't. Indeed, as Thomason 
says, "As a formal discipline, the study of 
indexioals, owes much of its development to 
MQnta~e and his students" \[22\]. (See especially 
\[10\] and \[11, 12\].) This last is most especially 
true with respect to the work of David Kaplan, both 
a student and a colleague of Montague's. For 
Kaplan disagreed with Montague precisely about the 
extent to which the formal treatment of contexts of 
utterances should be accommodated to the treatment 
of Intensionailty via possible worlds. And B&P 
start from where Kaplan leaves off. \[7, 8\] 
I shall assume once again the right to be sketchy: Montague adopted a very narrow stance 
towards issues in pragmatics, concerning himself 
so*ely with indexicais and tense and not concerning 
himself at aii with other issues about the purposes of speakers and hearers and the corresponding uses 
of sentences. **e In addition, the treatment of 
formal pragmatics was to follow the lead of formal 
semantics: the central notion to be investigated 
was that of truth of a sentence, but now reiatlve 
to both an interpretation and a eontext of use or 
~oint of reference. (See \[10, 11, 12, 18\].) The 
working hypothesis" was that one could and should 
give a thoroughly uniform treatment of indexicallty 
within the model-theoretic framework deployed for 
the treatment of the indexlcal-free constructions. 
Thus, for example, in standard quantificational 
theory, one of the "parameters" of an 
interpretation is a domain or universe of 
discourse; in standard accounts of modal languages, 
another parameter is a set of possible worlds; in 
tense logics, a set of points of time. Why stop 
there? It is clear when we ~et to indexicals that 
the three parameters I've just mentioned aren't 
sufficient to determine a function to truth-values. 
Just think of two simultaneous utterances of "You 
are dead wrong" in the same world, with all other 
*Barbara Grosz hints at agreement with this 
Judgment. "\[O\]ne place that situation semantics is 
more compatible with efforts in natural-language 
processing than previous approaches \[is tha£\] 
context and facts about the world participate at 
two points: (I) in interpretation, for determining 
such things as who the speaker is, the time of 
utterance..; (2) in evaluation, for determining 
such things as..whether the relationships expressed in the utterance hold." 
**For the former, see \[14\], see also \[15\]. 
m**Stalnaker is a wonderful example of someone 
working within the Montague tradition who does take the wider issues of praEmatics to heart. See \[19\]. 
things equal except speaker and addressee. In the 
interests of uniformity, stuff all such parameters 
into structures called points of reference, and who 
knows how many we'll need - see \[9\], where points 
of reference are called indices. Then the meaning 
of a sentence is a function from points of 
references into truth values. 
A number of researchers working within the 
MontaEue tradition (in a sense there was ,,~ ucner) 
were unhappy with this particular result of 
Montague's quest for generality; the most important 
apostate being Kaplan. s There are complex technical 
issues involved in the apostasy, centrally those 
involving the interaction of indexical and 
intenslonal constructions - interactions which, at 
the very least, cast doubt on the doctrine that the 
intenslons of expressions are total functions from 
the set of points of reference to extensions of the 
expression at that point of reference.** The end 
result, anyway, is the proposal for some type of a 
non-unlform two-step account. Montaguesque points 
of reference should be broken in two, with posslbie 
worlds (and possibly, moments of time) playing one 
role and contexts of use (possibly inciudlng 
moments of time) another, different, role. 
In this scheme, sentences get associated with 
functions from contexts of use to propositions and 
these in turn are functions from contexts to truth- 
values. Contexts, upon "application" to utterances 
of sentences, yield determinate propositions; 
worlds (world-times) function rather as points of 
evaluation, yielding truth values of determinate 
propositions.*** 
B&P, however, go beyond Kaplan's treatment, and 
in more than one direction. Cruclaily, the 
treatment of indexlcailty proper is only one aspect 
of the account of efficiency, in some ways, the 
least intriguing of the lot. Still, to drive home 
the first point: as it is with smoke pouring out of 
buildings, so too is it with sentences. The 
syntactic and semantic rules of a language, 
conventional regularities or constraints, determzne 
the meaning - the event-type meaning - of a 
sentence; features of the context of use of an 
utterance of that type get added in to determine 
what is actually said with that use. This is the 
event meaning of the utterance, also called its 
interpretation. Finally, that interpretation can 
be evaluated, either in a context which is 
essentially the same as the context of use, or some 
other; thereby yielding an evaluation of the 
utterance, (finally) a truth value. 
B. Beyond Indexicalitv 
For B&P, the features of the context of use go 
beyond those associated with the presence of 
explicit indexical items in the utterance - people 
with personal pronouns, places with "locatives", 
times with tense markers and temporal indicators. 
In particular they mention two such parameters: 
speaker connections and resource situations. Some 
aspects of the former can be looked on as aspects 
of indexicality, following the lines of Kaplan's 
treatment of demonstratives. But in other 
respects, e.g., the treatment of proper names, and 
certainly in the treatment of resource situations, 
the view they sketch seems to transcend the 
boundaries o~ even deviant model-theoretic 
semantics. For they mean to do justice, within a 
unified and systematic framework, both to the fact 
that the meaning of an utterance type 
*See \[7. 8\]. Others included Stalnaker and Kamp. See \[19, 20\] and \[6\]. 
**The extension appropriate to sentences and 
clauses being truth values. 
***There is even a version of this called "two- dimensional modal logic" \[20\]. 
31 
"underdetermines" the interpretation of an 
utterance of that type and to the fact the 
interpretation of an utterance "underdetermines" 
the information that can be imparted by that 
utterance. It is a constraint they impose on 
themselves that they be able to account for 
significant regularities with respect to "the flow 
of information", in so far as that flow is mediated 
by the use of language and in cases where the 
information is not determined by a compositional 
semantic theory. And such cases are the norm. 
Compositionality holds only at the level of event- 
type or linguistic meaning. The claim is that 
seeing linguistic meaning as a special case of the 
relational nature of meaning - that meaning resides 
in regularities between kinds of situations 
- allows them to produce an account which satisfies this constraint. 
c. Names 
$9~" let me say something about proper names and 
some~nlng ease aoout resource situations. Let us 
put aside for the moment the semantic type that 
poor little "David Israel" gets assigned in \[13\]. 
Instead, we shall pretend that it gets associated 
with some individual." But which individual? 
Surely with one named "David Israel"; but there are 
bunches of such, and many, many more Davids. The 
probleml of course, is that proper names aren't 
proper. ~* Just as surely, at the level of 
linguistic meaning it makes no sense for me to ~ 
special treatment with respect to my name. 
Still, if you (or I) hear M_Itch Marcus. right after 
my talk, complaining to someone that "David is dead 
wrong", we'll know who's being maligned. Why so? 
Because we are aware of the speaker s connections; 
more finely, of the relevant connections in this 
instance. At the level of event-type or linguistic 
meaning, the contribution of a name is to refer to 
an individual of that name. **'e On the other hand, 
it is a feature of the context of use, that the 
speaker of an utterance containing that name is 
connected in certain ways to such and such 
individual~ of that name. Surely Mirth knows lots 
of Davids and we might find him saying "David 
thinks that David is really dead wrong". Of 
course, he ~ht be talking about someone inclined 
to harsh and "oSJectlve" self-crlticiam; ~robably not. 
Just one more thing about names and speaker 
connections. I noted above that for B&P, the 
interpretation of an utterance event 
underdetermines the information carried by that 
event. The use of names is a locus of nice 
examples of this. It is no part of the 
interpretation (event meaning) of Hitch's complaint 
about me that my name is "David"; but someone who 
saw him say this while he (Mitch, that is) was 
surreptitiously looking can learn that my 
name is "David", or even t~a~a{am the David Israel 
who gave the talk on Situation Semantics. Even 
without that, someone could learn that Mitch knows l 
is connected with) at least one person so named. 
Of course, there are possibilities for 
"misinformation" here, too.) Just so, when I 
*Some possible individual? My grandmother, for 
one, would have disagreed. So, too, dc B&P. 
*'Mostly not; but how about "Tristan Tzara", to pick a name out of a hat? 
***English should have no truck with (even) benign analogues of bills of attainder. 
***eIt's a nice question whether some na~.es carr~ 
with them, at the linguistic level, species 
information as well. But surely it doesn't seem to 
De an asuse of English to call, say, a platypus "David Israel". 
introduce myself by saying "I'm David Israel", the 
interpretation of what I say on that occasion i3 
singularly uninteresting, being (roughly speaking) 
an instance of the law of self-identity. But I 
will have conveyed the information I wanted to, 
namely that I am a David Israel, that "David 
Israel" is my name (though not mine alone). That's 
why we engage in the (otherwise inexplicable) 
custom of making introductions. Anthropology 
aside, the central point is that Situation 
Semantics is meant to give us an account in which 
we can explain and predict such regularities in the 
flow of information as that exploited by the 
convention of introductions. This account must show 
how such regularities are related to the 
conventional regularities that determine the 
linguistic meaning of sentence types and the 
patterns of contextual determination which then 
generate the meanings of particular utterance 
events. 
D. Defining Descriptions 
An analogue of the problem of the impropriety of 
talk of proper names arises with respect to 
definite descriptions. Take a wild and wooly 
sentence such as "The dog is barking". Again, we 
want the denotations of such definite descriptions 
to be Just plain individuals; but again, which 
individuals? Surely, there is more than one dog in 
the world; does the definite description fail to 
refer because of non-uniqueness? Hardly; at the 
level of sentence meaning, there is no question of 
it's referring to some one individual dog. Rather 
we must introduce into our semantic account a ~ 
arameter for a set of resource situations. 
uppose, for " instance, that we have fixed a 
speaker, an audience and a (spatio-temporal) 
location of utterance of our sentence. These three 
are the main constituents of the parameter B&P call 
a discourse situation; note that this one parameter ~ 
retty much covers the contextual features 
ontague-Kaplan had in mind. Suppose also that a 
dog t otherwise unknown to our speaker and hls/her 
audience, just walked by the front porch, on which 
our protagonists are sitting. When the speaker 
utters the sentence he/she is exploiting a 
situation in which bo{h speaker and audience saw a 
lone dog stroll by; he/she is not describing either 
that particular recent situation or such a 
sltuation-type - there may have been many such; the 
two of them often sit out on that porch, the 
neighborhood is full of dogs. Rather, the speaker 
is referring to a situation in which that dog is 
barking. Which dog?. The one "contributed" by the 
resource situation; the one who just strolled by. 
It is an aspect of the linguistic meaning of a 
definite description that a resource situation 
should enter into the determination of its 
reference on a particular occasion of use; thus, an 
aspect of the meanings of sentences that a resource 
situation be a a parameter in the determination of 
the interpretations (event meanings) of sentential 
utterances. Moreover, one can imagine cases where 
what is of interest is precisely some feature of 
which resource situation a speaker is exploiting on 
a particular occasion. And here, too, as in the 
case of names or, more generally, of speaker 
connections, the claim is that the relational 
theory of meaning and the consequent emphasis on 
the centrality of the Principle of Efficiency give 
Situation Semantics a handle on a range of 
regularities connecting uses of languages with 
varieties of information that can be conveyed by 
such uses. 
IV LOGICAL FORM AND ENTAILMENT 
As we have noted, Barwlse and Perry's treatment 
of efficiency goes beyond indexlcality and, as 
embedded within their overall account, goes well 
beyond a Kaplan-Montague theory. An important 
theme in this regard is the radical de-emphaslzlng 
of the role of entailment in their semantic theory 
and the correlative fixing on statements, not 
sentences, as the primary locus of interpretation. 
This is yet another way in which B&P go beyond 
Kaplan's forays beyond Montague. 
I have said that in standard (or even mildly 
32 
deviant) model-theoretic accounts the key notion is 
that of truth on an interpretation, or in a model. 
Having said this, I might as well say that the key 
notion is that of entailment or logical 
consequence. A set of sentences S entails a 
sentence A iff there is no interpretation on which 
all of the sentences in S are true and A i3 false. 
From the purely model-theoretic point of view, this 
relation can be thought of as holding not between 
sentences, but between propositions (conceived of 
as the intenslons or meanings of sentences). For 
instance, it might be taken to hold between sets of 
possible worlds. Still, it is presumed (to put it 
mildly) that an important set of such relations 
among non-linguistic objects have syntactic 
realizations in relations holding among sentences 
which express those propositions. Moreover, that 
sentences stand in these relations is a function of 
certain specifiable aspects of their syntactic type - their "logical form". 
In artificial, logical languages, this 
presumption of syntactic realization can be made 
more or less good; and anyway, the connections 
between, on the one hand, syntactic types and modes 
of composition, and semantic values on the other, 
must be made completely explicit. In particular, 
one specifies a set of expresslons as the logical 
constants of the language, specifies how to build 
up complex expressfons by the use of those 
constants, operating ultimately on the "non-logical 
constants", and then - ipso facto - one has a ~ 
erfectly usable and precise notion of loglcai orm. 
In the standard run of such artificial 
languages, sentences (that is: sentence types, 
there being no need for a notion of tokens) can be, 
and typically are, assigned truth-values as their 
semantic values. Such languages do not allow for 
indexicality; hence the talk about "eternal 
sentences". The linguistic meaning of such a 
sentence need not be distinguished from the 
~roposltion expressed by a partlcular use of it.* 
unce Inuexicality is taken seriously, one can no 
longer attribute truth-values to senhences. (Note 
how this way of putting things suggests Just the 
unification of the treatment of indexlcallty with 
that of modality that appealed to Montague.) One 
can still, however, take as central the notion of a 
sentence being true in a context on an 
interpretation. The main reason for this move is 
that it allows one to develop a fairly standard 
notion of logical consequence or entailment at the 
level of sentences. Roughly, a set of sentences S 
entails a sentence A iff for every interpretation 
and for every context of use of that 
interpretation: if every sentence in S is true in a 
given context, then so too is A. 
Barwlse&Perry are prepared to deemphaslze 
radically the notion of entaliment among sentences. 
As they fully realize they must provide a new 
notion - a notion of one statement following from another. 
At the very least then, our theory will 
seek to account for why the truth of 
certain ~ follows from the truth 
of other 9_~. This move has several 
important consequences...There is a lot of 
information available from utterances that 
is simply missed in traditional accounts, 
accounts that ignore the relational aspect 
of meaning...A semantic theory must go far 
beyond traditional "patterns of 
inference"...A rather startllng consequence 
of this is that there can be no syntactic 
counterpart, of the kind traditionally 
sought in proof theory and theories of 
loglcal form, to the semantic theory of 
consequence. For consequence is simply not 
a relation between purely syntactic elements. 
*Hence part, at least, of the oddity of talk 
about using such a language by uttering sentences thereof. 
What's at stake here? A whole lot, I fear. 
First, utterances - e.g., the makings of assertions 
- are actions. They are not linguistic items at 
all; they have no logical forms. Of course, they 
typically involve the production of linguistic 
tokens, which - by virtue of being of such and such 
types - may have such forms. (Typically, but not 
always - witness the shaking or nodding of a head, 
the winking of an eye, the pointing of a finger, 
all in appropriate contexts of use, of co,, ~e.) 
Thus, entailment relations among s~acements 
(utterances) can't be cashed in directly in terms 
of relations holding among sentences in virtue of 
special aspects of their syntactic shape. Remember 
what was said above about the main reason for 
opting out of an account based on statements and 
for an account based on sentence(type)-in-a- 
context. If you don't remember, let me (and David 
Kaplan) remind you: 
First, it is important to distinguish an 
utterance from a sentence-ln-~-context. 
The former notion is from the theory of 
speech acts, the latter from semantics. I 
Utterances take time, and utterances of 
distinct sentences can not be simultaneous 
(i.e., in the same context). But in order 
to develop a logic of demonstratives it 
seems most natural to be able to evaluate 
several premisses and a conclusion all in 
the same context. \[8\]. (The emphasis by way 
of underlining is mine - D.I.) 
A logic has to do with entailment and validity; 
these are the central semantic notions; sentences 
are their linguistic loci. This all sounds 
reasonable enough, except of course for that quite 
unmotivated presumption that contexts of use can't 
be spatio-temporally extended. And it seems 
correspondingly unreasonable when B&P opt out. 
IT\]he ~ "Socrates is speaking" 
does not follow from the sentences "Every 
philosopher is speaking", "Socrates is a 
philosopher" even though this argument has 
the same "loglcal form" (on most accounts 
of logical form) as \["4 is an integral 
multiple of 2", "All integral multiples of 
2 are even" (so) "4 is even".\] In the 
first place, there is the matter of tense. 
At the very least the three sentences would 
have to be said at more or less the same 
time for the argument to be valid. 
Sentences are not true or false; only 
statements made with indicative sentences, 
utterances of certain kinds, are true or 
false. \[3\] (The example is mine - D.I.) 
B&P simplify somewhat. It is not required that 
all three sentences be uttered simultaneously (by 
one speaker). Roughly speaking, what is required 
is that the (spatio)temporal locations of their 
utterance be close together and that the "sum" of 
their locations overlap with that of some utterance 
of Socrates. But that isn't all. The speaker must 
be connected throughout to one and the same 
individual Socrates, else a pragmatic analogue of 
the fallacy of equivocation will result. The same 
(or something similar) could be said about the noun ~ 
hrase "every philosopher", for such phrases - just 
ike definite descriptions - require for their 
interpretation a resource situation. One can 
imagine a case wherein a given speaker, over a 
specified time and at a specified place, connected 
to one and the same guy named Socrates, exploits 
two different resource situations contributing two different groups of philosophers, one for each of 
*Thls is what is known in the trade as a stlpulatlve definition. 
33 
the first two utterances. (The case is stronger, 
of course, if we substitute for the second sentence "Socrates is one of the philosophers.") 
It must certainly seem that too much of the baby 
is being tossed out with the water; but there are 
alleged to be (compensating?) gains: 
There is a lot of information available 
from utterances that is simply missed in 
traditional accounts, accounts that ignore 
the relational aspect of meaning. If 
someone comes up to me and says--Melanie 
saw a bear." I may learn not Just that 
Melanie saw a bear, but also that the 
speaker is somehow connected to Melanie in 
a way that allows him to refer to her using 
"Melanie". And I learn that the speaker is 
somehow in a position to have information 
about what Melanie saw. A semantic theory 
must go far beyond traditional "patterns of 
inference" to account for the external 
significance of language...A semantic 
theory must account for how language fits 
into the general flow of information. The 
capturing of entailments between statements 
is Just one aspect of a real theory of the 
information in an utterance. We think the 
relation theory of meaning provides the 
proper framework for such a theory. By 
looking at linguistic meanir~ as a relation 
between utterances and described 
situations, we can focus on the many 
coordinates that allow information to be 
extracted from utterances, information not 
only about the situation described'ni but also about the speaker and her place the 
world. \[3\] 
A. A ~U.t~ A~ 
Despite the heroic sentiments just expressed, 
B&P scarcely eschew sentences, a semantic account 
account of which they are, after all, aiming to 
provide. In the formal account statements get 
represented by n-tuples (of course), one element of 
which is the sentence uttered; and if you like. it 
is the sentence-under-syntactic-analysls. (This 
last bit is misleading, but not terribly.) Other 
elements of the tuple are a discourse situation and 
set of speaker connections and resource situations. 
Any%ray, there is the sentence. Given that, how about their logical form~q? 
Before touching on that issue, let me raise 
another and related feature of the account. This 
is the decision of B&P to let English sentences be 
the domain of their purely compositional semantic 
functions. For Montague, the "normal form" 
semantic interpretation of English went by way of a 
translation from English into some by now "fairly 
standard" logical language. (Such languages became 
fairly standard largely due to Montague's work.) 
Montague always claimed that thl3 was merely a 
pedagogical and simplifying device; and he provldeS 
an abstract account of how a "direct" semantic 
interpretation would go. Still, his practice 
leaves one with the taste of a search for hidden 
logical forms of a familiar type underlying the 
grammmtical forms of English sentences. No such 
intermediate logical language is forthcoming in 
Situation Semantics. First there is ALIASS: 
An Artificial Language for Illustrating 
Aspects of Situation Semantics... has more 
of the structure of English than any other 
artificial language we know, but it does 
not pretend to be a fragment of English, or 
any sort of "logical form" of English. It 
is Just what its name implies and nothing more. 
Next, and centrally, there is English. The decision to present a semantic theory of English 
directly may make the end product look even more 
different than it is. It certainly has the effect 
of depriving us of those familiar structures for 
which familiar "theorem provers" can be specified, 
and thus reinforces the sense of loss for seekers 
after a certain brand of entailments. Some may 
already feel the tell tale symptoms of withdrawal 
from an acute addiction. 
There is, however, more to it than that - or 
maybe the attendant liberation is enough. For 
instance, are English quantifiers logical 
constants, and if so, which ones? Which English 
quantlfiers correspond to which "formal" 
quantiflers? • Is there really a sententlai negation 
operator in English? Well, surely nit is not the 
case that" seems to qualify; but how about "not"? 
And how about conjunction? 
Consider, for example, a statement made 
with the sentence (I) Joe admires Sarah and 
she admires him. Let us confine our 
attention to the utterances in which (I) 
has the antecedent relations indicated by 
(I') Joe-1 admires Sarah-2 and she-2 
admires him-1. While sentence (I) is a 
conjunction of two sentences, a statement 
made with (1) in the way \[with the 
connections - D.I.\] indicated by (I') is 
not a qonJunotion of independent 
statements. \[3\] 
In general, if ul and u2 are two statements with 
the same discourse situations and connections (and 
resource situations?), some sense can be made out 
of a \[sic\] conjunctive or \[sic\] disjunctive 
statement, with ul and u2 as "parts". But this is 
not true of arbitrary statements. Moreover, as in 
the case above, if we have a \[sic\] conjunctive 
statement, there may be no coherent decomposition 
of it into two independent statements. Talk of 
conjunctive and especially of disjunctive 
statements is likely to be wildly misleading. For 
the latter suggests, quite wrongl\[, that the 
utterer is either asserting one "dis3unct" or the 
other. "A statement made using a disjunctive 
sentence is not the disjunction of two separate 
statements." (\[3\].) 
In an appendix to "Situations and Attitudes", 
B&P suggest an analogue of propositional logic for 
statements within a very simple fragment of ALIASS. 
There is no (sentential) negation and no 
conditional; but more to the point, there are no 
unrestricted laws of statement entailment, e.g., 
between an arbitrary "conjunctive statement" and 
its two "conjunots". Things get even worse when we 
add complex noun phrases to the fragment. The mind 
boggles. 
V THE PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES 
Here I shall be mercilessly brlef. I* The 
conventional wisdom, from Frege through to its 
logical culmination in MontaEue, has been that 
~ropositional attitude constructions are 
referentially opaque"; more particularly, that 
substitution of co-designatlve singular terms 
within them does not preserve the truth-value of 
the whole. Within that orthodoxy there has been 
disagreement as to whether they are also 
hyperintensional; that is, as to whether 
tSee \[I\] passim; but especially the first two 
sections. 
ImMostly because of the sheer "sex appeal" of the 
issues involved, and partly because of the 
availability of the relevant texts, it has been 
their treatment of the propositional attitude 
contexts that has made B&P a cause celebre among philosophers. This is unfortunate; so I intend to 
do my part, by somewhat underplaying this whole 
tangle. 
34 
substituting necessarily co-designative terms or 
logically equivalent sentences within them 
preserves truth-value. Montague himself thought 
they were not hyperintensionai; but he countenanced 
the other view. (And sketched an account to handle 
it.) Barwise and Perry have the unique distinction 
of believing that said contexts are at least 
intensional and yet transparent to substitution of 
singular terms." This position is both solitary and 
thought to be incoherent. If it were in fact 
untenable, that would be most unfortunate for them, 
as it is also more or less mandated by their 
adopting an approach centered on the external 
significance of language. 
Indeed, there is supposed to be a proof that it 
is incoherent. The argument in question, which 
B.&P. call the slingshot, is sometimes supposed to 
show that all sentences with the same truth-value 
must designate the same thing; and hence, of 
course, that truth-values must be the primary 
semantic values of sentences. More usually and 
somewhat more technically, it has been supposed to 
show that if a sentential context allows 
substitution of logically equivalent sentences and 
co-deslgnating definite descriptions salva 
veritate, then that context must be truth- 
functional. More clearly: that all modes of 
sentence composition are truth-functlonal unless 
they're opaque. That is, the only contribution 
made by a sentence, so embedded, to the whole can 
be its truth-value. 
In fact, the slingshot is not a "knockdown 
proof"; that it is not is recognized by many of its 
major slingers(?). (See, for instance, L16, 17\].) 
Instead, in all of its forms, it rests on some form 
or other of two critical assumptions: 
I. logically equivalent sentences are 
intersubstitutable in all contexts salva 
veritate; or, such sentences have the 
same semantic value 
2. the semantic value of a sentence is 
unchanged when a component singular term 
is replaced by another, co-referentlal 
singular term. 
B&P reject the assumptions that underlie the 
slingshot. Here, too, especially with respect to 
the second assumption, tricky technical issues 
about the treatment of singular terms - both simple 
and complex - in a standard logic with identity are 
involved. B&P purposefully ignore these issues. 
They are interested in English, not in sentences of 
a standard logic with identity; and anyway, those 
very same issues actually get "transformed" into 
precisely the issues about singular terms they do 
discuss, issues having to do with the distinction 
between referential and attributive uses of 
(complex) singular terms. (See their discussion in 
\[2\] and chapter 7 of \[3\].) To show my strength of 
character, I'm not going to discuss the sexy issue 
of transparency to substitution of singular terms 
- except to say that, like Montague, B&P want a 
uniform treatment of singular terms as these occur 
both inside and outside of propositional attitude 
contexts; and that they also want to have it that 
the denotations of such terms are Just plain 
individual objects. (How perverse\[) Rather, I 
want to look briefly at the first assumption about 
IThere is a class of exceptions to this, but I want not to get bogged down in details here. 
logical equivalence, i* 
A. The Relation Theory of M~anin~ 
With respect to the end-result, what's crucial 
is that B&P reject the alleged central consequence 
of the slingshot: that the primary semantic value 
of a sentence is its truth-value. Of course, given 
what we have already said, a better way to ~uc this 
is that for them, although statements are bearers 
of truth-values, the primary semantic value of a 
statement is not its truth value. 
That honor is accorded to a collection of 
situations or events. Very roughly, the story goes 
like this: the syntactic and semantic rules of the 
language associate to each sentence type a type of 
situations or states-of-affalrs; intuitively, the 
type actualizations of which would be accurately, 
though partially, described by any statement made 
using the sentence.* Thus: 
Consider the sentence "I am sitting". 
Its meaning is, roughly, a relation that 
holds between an utterance ~ and a 
situation ~ Just in case there is a 
(spatio-temporal) location 1 and an 
individual ~, i is speaking at i. and in ~, 
is sitting at i .... The extension of this 
relation will be a larKe class of pairs of 
abstract situations. \[3\]- 
Now consider a particular utterance of that 
sentence, say by Mitch, at a specific location i'. 
Then any situation that has \[Mitch\] 
sitting at i' will be an interpretation of 
the utterance. An utterance usually 
describes lots of different situations, or 
at any rate partially describes them. 
Because of this, it is sometimes useful to 
think of the interpretation as the class of 
such situations. Then we can say that the 
situations appearing in the interpretation 
of our utterance vary greatly in how much 
they constrain the world...When uttered on 
a specific occasion, our sentence 
constrains the described situation to be a 
certain way, to be llke one of the 
situations in the interpretation. Or, one 
might say, it constrains the described 
situation to be one of the interpretations. \[3\] 
B. On Lo~IcalEcuivalence 
If the primary semantic value of a sentence is a 
collection or a type of situations, then it is not 
surprising that logically equivalent sentences - sentences true in the same models - might not 
have the same semantic values, and hence, might not 
mmOne point to make, though, is the following: 
the indexical personal pronouns are certainly 
singular terms. Frege's general line on the 
referential opacity of propositional attitude 
contexts certainly seems at its shakiest precisely 
in appiicatlon to such pronouns - and in general to 
indexical elements. And remember if B&P are right, 
there is an element of "indexicality" in the use of 
proper names. If Mitch believes that David is dead 
wrong and I'm (that) David, then Mitch believes 
that I'm dead wrong. If Mitch believes that I'm 
dead wrong and I am David Israel. then Mitch 
believes that (this) David Israel is wrong. \[14, 15\] 
ml should note that neither "situation" nor 
"event" is a technical term in Situation Semantics; though "event-type" is . 
35 
be intersubstitutable salvo semantic value. 
Consider the two sentences: (I) Joe eats and (2) 
Joe eats, and Sarah sleeps or Sarah doesn't sleep. 
Let's grant that (I) and (2) are logically 
equivalent. But do they have the same "referent" 
or semantic value? 
If we think that sentences stand for 
situations..then we will not be at all 
inclined to accept the first principle 
required in the slingshot. The two 
logically equivalent sentences just do not 
have the same subject matter, they do not 
describe situations involving the same 
objects and properties. The first sentence 
will stand for all the situations in which 
Joe eats, the second sentence for those 
situations in which Joe eats and Sarah 
sleeps plus those in which Joe eats and 
Sarah doesn't sleep. Sarah is present in 
all of these. Since she is not present in 
may of the situations that "Joe eats" 
stands for, these sentences, though 
logically equivalent, do not stand for the 
same entity. (Obviously B&P are here 
ignoring the "indexlcality" inherent in 
proper uses of proper names - D.I.) \[3\] 
Notice that without so much as a glance in the 
direction of a single propositional attitude 
context, we can see how B&P can avoid certain well- 
known troubles that plague the standard model- 
theoretic treatments o~ such constructions.* 
Moreover and most importantly, they gain these fine 
powers of discrimination among "meanings" without 
following either Frege into a third realm of sense 
or Fodor (?) deep into the recesses of the mind. 
The significance of sentences, even as they occur 
in propositional attitude contexts, is out into the 
surrounding world, t* 
VI THE BOTTOM LINE 
What's the bottom line? Clearly, it's too soon 
to say. Indeed, I assume many of you will simply 
want to wait until you can look at least at some 
treatment of some fragment of English. Others 
would llke as well to get some idea of how the 
project of Situation Semantics might be realized 
computationally. For instance, it is clear even 
from what little I've said that the semantic values 
of various kinds of expression types are going to be quite different from the norm and much thought 
will be needed to specify a formalism for 
representing and manipulating these representations 
adequately. Again, wouldn't it be nice to be told 
something at least about the metaphysics of 
Situation Semantics, about situations, abstract, 
actual, factual and real - all four types figure in 
some way in the account; about events, event-types, 
courses-of-events, schema, etc? Yes, it would be 
nice. Some, no doubt, were positively lusting 
after the scoop on how B&P handle the classic ~ 
uzzles of intensionality with respect to singular 
erms. And so on. All in good time. 
What I want to do, instead, is to end with a 
claim, Barbara Grosz's claim in fact, that 
*On this point, compare, e.g., \[22\]. I do not 
mean to imply that there aren't good reasons for 
denying the hyperintensionality of the 
propositional attitudes. There are. See \[21\] 
Still, no one doubts that such a position is 
counter-intuitlve. 
t'Actually, there is another big issue looming 
here, the one that hangs on B&P's opting for a 
treatment which takes properties and relations, 
intensionally conceived, as primitive - instead, that is, of pretending that properties are 
m m functions from possible worlds into sets. Sets, 
of course, there are; but so too are there 
properties. 
attention should be paid. At the moment, the 
bottom line with respect to Situation Semantics is 
not, I think, to be arrived at by toting up 
technical details, as bedazzling as these will 
doubtless be. Rather, it is to be gotten at by 
attention precisely to THE BIG PICTORE. 
The relational theory of meaning, and more 
broadly, the centrality in Situation Semantics of 
the "flow of information" - the view that that part 
of this flow that is mediated by the uses of 
language should be seen as "part and parcel of the 
general flow of information that uses natural meaning" - allows reasoned hope for a theoretical 
framework within which work in pragmatics ann one 
theory of speech acts, as well research in the 
theory of discourse, can find a proper place. In 
many of these areas, there is an abundance of 
insight, harvested from close descriptive analyses 
of a wide range of phenomena - a range hitherto 
hidden from both orthodox linguists and 
philosophers. There are now even glimmerings of 
regularities. But there has been no overarching 
theoretical structure within which to systematize 
these insights, and those scattered reguiaritles, 
and through which to relate them to the results of 
syntactic and formal semantic analyses. Situation 
Semantics may help us in developing such a 
framework. 
This last is a good point at which to stop; so I 
shall. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This research was supported in part by the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 
monitored by ONR under Contract No. N000~-777 
C-0378 and in part by the Office of Naval Researcn 
under Contract No. N00014-77-C-0371. Also, 
special thanks are due to B&P- who, of cpurse~_are 
solely responsible for ai± ~ne we&ro loeas 
presented in this paper. Any remaining 
responsibility is to be charged to Hitch Marcus, 
who suggested I do this, and to Brian Smith, who 
agreed. 
\[I\] 
\[2\] 
\[3\] 
\[4\] 
\[5\] 
\[6\] 
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pages 1-69. Yale University Press, New 
Haven, 1974. 
37 
