COMMONSENSE METAPHYSICS 
AND LEXICAL SEMANTICS 
Jerry R. Hobbs, William Croft, Todd Davies, 
Douglas Edwards, and Kenneth Laws 
Artificial Intelligence Center 
SRI International 
1 Introduction 
In the TACITUS project for using commonsense knowl- 
edge in the understanding of texts •bout mechanical de- 
vices and their failures, we have been developing various 
commonsense theories that are needed to mediate between 
the way we talk about the behavior of such devices and 
causal models of their operation. Of central importance in 
this effort is the axiomatization of what might be called 
"commonsense metaphysics'. This includes a number of 
areas that figure in virtually every domain of discourse, 
such as scalar notions, granularity, time, space, material, 
physical objects, causality, functionality, force, and shape. 
Our approach to lexical semantics is then to construct core 
theories of each of these areas, and then to define, or at 
least characterize, • large number of lexical items in terms 
provided by the core theories. In the TACITUS system, 
processes for solving pragrnatics problems posed by • text 
will use the knowledge base consisting of these theories in 
conjunction with the logical forms of the sentences in the 
text to produce an interpretation. In this paper we do 
not stress these interpretation processes; this is another, 
important aspect of the TACITUS project, and it will be 
described in subsequent papers. 
This work represents a convergence of research in lexical 
semantics in linguistics and efforts in AI to encode com- 
monsense knowledge. Lexical semanticist* over the years 
have developed formalisms of increasing adequacy for en- 
coding word meaning, progressing from simple sets of fea- 
tures (Katz and Fodor, 1963) to notations for predicate- 
argument structure (Lakoff, 1972; Miller and Johnson- 
Laird, 1976), but the early attempts still limited 
to world knowledge and assumed only very restricted sorts 
of processing. Workers in computational linguistics intro- 
duced inference (Rieger, 1974; Schank, 1975) and other 
complex cognitive processes (Herskovits, 1982) into our 
understanding of the role of word meaning. Recently, lin- 
guists have given greater attention to the cognitive pro- 
cesses that would operate on their representations (e.g., 
Talmy, 1983; Croft, 1986). Independently, in AI an ef- 
fort arose to encode large amounts of commonsense knowl- 
edge (Hayes, 1979; Hobbs and Moore, 1985; Hobbs et al. 
1985). The research reported here represents a conver- 
gence of these various developments. By developing core 
theories of several fundamental phenomena and defining 
lexical items within these theories, using the full power 
of predicate calculus, we awe able to cope with complex- 
Sties of word meaning that have hitherto escaped lexical 
semanticists, within a framework that gives full scope to 
the planning and reasoning processes that manipulate rep- 
resentations of word meaning. 
In constructing the core theories we are attempting to 
adhere to several methodological principles. 
I. One should aim for characterization of concepts. 
rather than definition. One cannot generally expect to find 
necessary and sulBcient conditions for a concept. The most 
we tun hope for is to find a number of necessary condi- 
tions and • number of sufficient conditions. This amounts 
to ~ying that • great many predicates are primitive, but 
primitives that are highly interrelated with the rest of the 
knowledge base. 
2. One lhould determine the minimal structure neces- 
ury for • concept to make sense. In efforts to axiomatize 
some area, there are two positions one may take, exem- 
plified by set theory and by group theory. In axiomatiz- 
ing set theory, one attempts to capture exactly some con- 
cept one ham strong intuitions about. If the axiomatization 
turns out to have unexpected models, this exposes an in- 
adequacy. In group theory, by contrast, one characterizes 
an abstract clam of structures. If there turn out to be 
unexpected models, this is a serendipitous discovery of a 
new phenomenon that we can reason about using an old 
theory. The pervffisive character of metaphor in natural 
language discourse shows that our commonsense theories 
of the world ought to be much more like group theory than 
set theory. By seeking minimal structures in axiomatizing 
concepts, we optimize the possibilities of using the theories 
in metaphorical and analogical contexts. This principle 
is illustrated below in the section on regions. One conse- 
quence of this principle is that our approach will seem more 
syntactic than semantic. We have concentrated more on 
127 
specifying axioms than on constructing models. Our view 
is that the chief role of models in our effort is for proving 
the consistency and independence of sets of axioms, and for 
showing their adequacy. As an example of the last point, 
many of the spatial and temporal theories we construct 
are intended at least to have Euclidean space or the real 
numbers as one model, and a subclass of graph-theoretical 
structures as other models. 
3. A balance must be struck between attempting to 
cover all cases and aiming only for the prototypical cases. 
In general, we have tried to cover as many cases as poe- 
sable with an elegant axiomatization, in line with the two 
previous principles, but where the formalization begins to 
look baroque, we assume that higher processes will suspend 
some inferences in the marginal cases. We assume that in- 
ferences will be drawn in a controlled fashion. Thus, every 
outr~, highly context-dependent counterexample need not 
be accounted for, and to a certain extent, definitions can 
be geared specifically for a prototype. 
4. Where competing ontologies suggest themselves in • 
domain, one should attempt to construct a theory that ac- 
commodates both. Rather than commit oneself to adopt- 
ing one set of primitives rather than another, one should 
show how each set of primitives can be characterized in 
terms of the other. Generally, each of the ontologies is 
useful for different purposes, and it is convenient to be 
able to appeal to both. Our treatment of time iUustrates 
this. 
5. The theories one constructs should be richer in axioms 
than in theorems. In mathematics, one expectsto state 
half a dozen axioms and prove dozens of theorems from 
them. In encoding commonsense knowledge it seems to be 
just the opposite. The theorems we seek to prove on the 
basis of these axioms are theorems •bout specific situations 
which are to be interpreted, in particular, theorems about 
a text that the system is attempting to understand. 
6. One should •void falling into "black holes'. There 
are a few "mysterious" concepts which crop up repeatedly 
in the formalization of commonsense metaphysics. Among 
these are "relevant* (that is, relevant to the task at hand) 
and "normative" {or conforming to some norm or pattern). 
To insist upon giving a satisfactory analysis of these before 
using them in analyzing other concepts is to crom the event 
horizon that separates lexical semantics from philosophy. 
On the other hand, our experience suggests that to •void 
their use entirely is crippling; the lexical semantics of • 
wide variety of other terms depends upon them. Instead, 
we have decided to leave them minimally analyzed for the 
moment and use them without scruple in the analysis of 
other commonsense concepts. This approach will allow us 
to accumulate many examples of the use of these mysteri- 
ous concepts, and in the end, contribute to their success- 
ful analysis. The use of these concepts appears below in 
the discussions of the words "immediately", "sample', and 
"operate". 
We chose as an initial target problem to encode the com- 
monsense knowledge that underlies the concept of "wear", 
as in • part of a device wearing out. Our aim was to define 
"we•.r" in ternm of predicates characterized elsewhere in 
the knowledge base and to infer consequences of wear. For 
something to wear, we decided, is for it to lose impercepti- 
ble bits of material from its surface due to abrasive action 
over time. One goal,which we have not yet achieved, is to 
be able to prove as a theorem that since the shape of a part 
of • mechanical device is often functional and since loss of 
material can result in • change of shape, wear of a part of 
• device can result in the failure of the device as a whole. 
In addition, as we have proceded, we have characterized a 
number of words found in a set of target texts, as it has 
become possible. 
We are encoding the knowledge as axioms in what is 
for the most part • first-order logic, described in Hobbs 
(1985a), although quantification over predicates is some- 
times convenient. In the formalism there is a nominaliza- 
tion operator " ' " for reifying events and conditions, as 
expressed in the following axiom schema: 
0'*)~(*) E (3.)~(e, .) ^ E~ot(e) 
That is, p is true of z if and only if there is a condition e 
of p being true of z and e exists in the real world. 
In our implementation so Ear, we have been proving sim- 
ple theorems from our axioms using the CG5 theorem- 
prover developed by Mark Stickel (1982), but we are only 
now beginning to use the knowledge base in text process- 
inf. 
2 Requirements on Arguments of 
Predicates 
There is a notational convention used below that deserves 
some explanation. It has frequently been noted that re- 
lational words in natural language can take only certain 
types of words as their arguments. These are usually de- 
scribed as selectional constraints. The same is true of pred- 
icJttm in our knowledge base. They are expressed below by 
ruin of the form 
p(*, y) : .(*, y) 
This means that for p even to make sense applied to r and 
If, it must be the case that r is true of z and y. The logical 
import of this rule is that wherever there is an axiom of 
the form 
0'*,v)p(.,y) D q(.,.) 
this is really to be read as 
(vz, y)p(z,~) ^ r(z,,) D q(z,y) 
128 
The checking of selectional constraints, therefore, falls out 
as a by-product of other logical operations: the constraint 
r(z, y) must be verified if anything else is to be proven from 
p(z, ~). 
The simplest example of such an r(z, If) is a conjunction 
of sort constraints r,(z) ^ r,(y). Our approach is a gener- 
alization of this, because much more complex requirements 
can be placed on the arguments. Consider, for example, 
the verb "range". if z ranges from If to :, there must be 
a scale s that includes It and z, and z must be a set of en- 
tries that are located at various places on the scale. This 
can be represented as follows: 
range(z, If, :) : (3.}.eels(.} ^ If E • 
^ z E • ^ .st(z) 
^ (vu)lu E : 3 (3v)v e • ^ ~(n, v)\] 
3 The Knowledge Base 
3.1 Sets and Granularity 
At the foundation of the knowledge base is an axiomatizw 
tion of set theory. It follows the standard Zermelo-Frankel 
approach, except that there is no Axiom of Infinity. 
Since so many concepts used in discourse are $q'ain- 
dependent, a theory of granularity is also fundamental (see 
Hobbs 1985b). A grain is defined in terms of an indistin- 
guishability relation, which is reflexive and symmetric, but 
not necessarily transitive. One grain can be a reJ~nemeal 
of another with the obvious definition. The most refined 
grain is the identity grain, i.e., the one in which every two 
distinct elements are distinguishable. One possible rela- 
tionship between two grains, one of which is z refinement 
of the other, is what we call an "Archimedean relation', 
after the Archimedean property of real numbers. Intu- 
itively, if enough events occur that are imperceptible at the 
coarser grain 9* but perceptible at the §ner grain Ih, then 
the aggregate will eventually be.perceptible at the coarser 
grain. This is an important property in phenomena 1rob. 
ject to the Heap Paradox. Wear, for instance, eventually 
has significant consequences. 
3.2 Scales 
A great many of the most common words in English havre 
scales as their subject matter. This includes many prepmb 
tions, the most common adverbs, comparatives, and many 
abstract verbs. When spatial vocabulary is used metaphor- 
ically, it is generally the scalar aspect of space that carries 
over to the target domain. A scale is defined as a set of 
elements, together with a partial ordering and a granular,. 
ity (or an indistinguishability relation). The partial or- 
dering and the indistinguishability relation are consistent 
with each other. 
0fz.if.z)z<yAif~z D z<zVz~z 
It is useful to have an adjacency relation between points on 
a scale, and there are a number of ways we could introduce 
it. We could simply take it to be primitive; in a scale 
having a distance function, we could define two points to 
be adjacent when the distance between them is less than 
some ~; finally, we could define adjacency in terms of the 
grain-size: 
fvz, y.,}a~(z, r.') =- 
(3 :), ~, ^, ~ If ^ -,\[z ~ If\], 
Two important possible properties of scales are connect- 
edness and denseness. We can say that two elements of a 
scale are connected by a chain of adj relations: 
(VZ. If. J)cmmeded(z. If. e) _= 
• dj(z, If, .) v 
(3 :)ndj(z. z. +) ^ connected(:. If. +) 
A scale is connected (econnecled) if all pairs of elements 
are connected. A scale is dense if between any two points 
there is a third point, until the two points are so close 
together that the grain-size won't let us tell what the situ- 
ation is. Cranking up the magnification could well resolve 
the continuous space into a discrete set, as objects into 
at, om,. 
(V,}den,e(,) E 
fVz, If, <)z E • ^ If E. ^ order(<, s) ^ z < If 
D (3 :}(. < z ^ : < If) 
v (~a z)(z ~ : ^ • ~ y) 
This captures the commonsense notion of continuity. 
A subscale of a scale has as its elements a subset of the 
elements of the scale and has as its partial ordering and its 
grain the partial ordering and the grain of the scale. 
(VJ,. <. ~)e,de,(<. s,) ^ grain(--,.,) 
D (W,s)\[,u6,cele(s,.,,) 
m ,ub,d(,s. ,t) ^ order(<, e,) ^ grain(.-., s,)\] 
An interval can be defined as a connected subscale: 
(Vi)imftq~el(i) m (3.)scale(e) 
^ nb.eaiz(i, .) ^ ,connected(i) 
The relations between time intervals that Allen and 
Kauts (1985) have defined can be defined in a straight- 
forward manner in the approach presented here, applied 
to intervth in general. 
A concept closely related to Scales is that of a "cycle'. 
This is a system which has a natural ordering locally but 
contains a loop globally. Examples include the color wheel, 
clock times, and geographical locations ordered by "east 
of.. %%'o have axiomatized cycles iri terms of a ternary 
/asfween relation, whose axioms parallel the axioms for a 
partial ordering. 
The figure-ground relationship is of fundamental impor- 
tance in language. We encode this with the primitive pred- 
icate af. The minimal structure that seems to be necessary 
for something to be a ground is that of a scale; hence, this 
is a selectional constraint on the arguments of at. 
129 
at(z, ~} : (3 s}y • s ^ scale(s) 
At this point, we are already in • position to define some 
fairly complex words. As an illustration, we give the ex- 
ample of "range* as in "z ranges from It to z": 
(V=, V, z)range(=, U, :) - 
(3 s, s|, ul, us)scale(s},^ swbscale(el, s) 
^bottom(y, s,} ^ top(z,s,) 
^"1 • z ^ at(~s, y} 
^us • z ^ at(u:,z) 
^(Vu}\[n • = ~ (3v}t, • s, A tt(u,t,}\] 
A very important scale is the linearly ordered scale of 
numbers. We do not plan to reason axiomatically about 
numbers, but it is useful in natural language processing to 
have encoded a few facts about numbers. For example, • 
set has a cardinality which is an element of the number 
scale. 
Verticality is a concept that would be most properly an- 
alyzed in the section on space, but it is a property that 
many other scales have acquired metaphorically, for what- 
ever reason. The number scale is one of these. Even in the 
absence of an analysis of verticality, it is • useful property 
to have as a primitive in lexical semantics. 
The word "high* is a vague term that asserts an entity is 
in the upper region of some scale. It requires that the scale 
be a vertical one, such as the number scale. The vertical- 
ity requirement distinguishes "high* from the more gen- 
eral term'very*; we can say "very hard* but not "highly 
hard'. The phrase "highly planar" sounds all right be- 
cause the high register of "planar* suggests a quantifiable, 
scientific accuracy, whereas the low register of "fiat* makes 
"highly fiat* sound much worse. 
The test of any definition is whether it allows one to draw 
the appropriate inferences. In our target texts, the phrase 
"high usage* occurs. Usage is a set of using events, and the 
verticality requirement on "high" forces us to coerce the 
phrase into "a high or large number of using events". Com- 
bining this with an axiom that says that the use of • me- 
chanical device involves the likelihood of abrasive events, 
as defined below, and with the definition of "wear" in terms 
of abrasive events, we should be able to conclude the like- 
lihood of wear. 
3.3 Time: Two Ontologles 
There are two possible ontoiogies for time. In the first, the 
one most acceptable to the mathematically minded, there 
is a time line, which is a scale having some topological 
structure. We can stipulate the time line to be linearly 
ordered (although it is not in approaches that build ig- 
norance of relative times into the representation of time 
(e.g., Hobbs, 1974) nor in approaches using branching fu- 
tures (e.g., McDermott, 1985)), and we can stipulate it to 
be dense (although it is not in the situation calculus). We 
take before to be the ordering on the time line: 
(Vtl, ts}beforc(t,, t:) .~ 
(3 T, <}Time-line(T} ^ order(<, T) 
^tie ~ A tzET Atl ~t2 
We allow both instants and intervals of time. Most events 
occur at some instant or during some interval. In this 
approach, nearly every predicate takes a time argument. 
In the second ontology, the one that seems to be more 
deeply rooted in language, the world consists of a large 
number of more or less independent processes, or histories, 
or sequences of events. There is a primitive relation change 
between conditions. Thus, 
can.go(e,, ~} ^ p(e,, z} ^ ¥(e:, z) 
says that there is a change from the condition el of p being 
true of z to the condition ez of q being true of z. 
The time line in this ontology is then an artificial con- 
struct, • regular sequence of imagined abstract events-- 
think of them as ticks of a clock in the National Bureau 
of Standards--to which other events can be related. The 
change ontology seems to correspond to the way we e×- 
perience the world. We recognize relations of causality, 
change of state, and copresence among events and condi- 
tions. When events are not related in these ways, judg- 
ments of relative time must be mediated by copresence 
relations between the events and events on a clock and 
change of state relations on the clock. 
The predicate change possesses & limited transitivity. 
There has been • change from Reagan being an actor to 
Reagan being President, even though he was governor in 
between. But we probably do not want to say there has 
been • change from Reagan being an actor to Margaret 
Thatcher being Prime Minister, even though the second 
comes after the first. 
We can say that times, viewed in this ontology as events, 
always have a change relation between them. 
(Vti, t:Jbefore(tl,t:} ~ ehange(tl, t:) 
The predicate change is related to before by the axiom 
(re,, ca}change(e,, e:) 
(3 el, t:)at(el, tl ) 
^at(es, t,} ^ ks fore(t1, t:) 
This does not allow us to derive change of state from tern- 
pond succession. For this, we need axioms of the form 
~¢e,,q,t,,tz, m)f(e,,z) A at(e,,G) 
^fI(ez, z ) ^ at(ca, t=) ^ bcfore(tl,l~) 
chance(el, ¢:) 
That is, if z is p at time tl and q at a later time t:, then 
there has been a change of state from one to the other. 
Time arguments in predications can be viewed as abbrevi- 
ations: 
(v=,t)p(=,t} -= (3e)f(e,:) ^ ut(e, t) 
130 
The word "move', or the predica~ move, (as in "z 
moves from g to z') can tbe• be defined equivale•tly in 
terms of change 
(Vz, y, .}move(., It, z} E 
(3 e, , e, )change( e t , e, ) 
^ at'(es, z, It) ^ at'(e,,., z) 
m 
or in terms of the time line 
(v :, It, :)mo,,e(., y, .) m 
(3 is, t,)at(z, y, t, ) ^ at(z, z, t2) ^ before(tt, f,) 
In English and apparently all other natural languages, 
both ontologies are represented i• the lexicon. The time 
line ontology is found i• clock and calendar terms, tense 
systems of verbs, and in the deictic temporal locatives such 
as "yesterday*, "today*, "tomorrow*, "last night", sad so 
on. The change ontology is exhibited in mvst verbs, and 
in temporal clausal connectives. The universal presence 
of both classes of lexical items and grammatical mark- 
ers in natural languages requires a theory which can ac- 
commodate both o•tologies, illustrating the importance of 
methodological principle 4. 
Among temporal connectives, the word "while" presents 
interesting problems. I• "st while e~', s2 must be an event 
occurring over • time interval; et must be an event and 
may occur either at a point or over an interval. One% first 
guess is that the point or interval for et must be included 
in the interval for ca. However, there are cases, such as 
it rained while I was in Philadelphia. 
or 
The electricity should be off while the switch is 
being repaired. 
which suggest the reading "h is included in el*. We came 
to the conclusion that one can infer •o more than that 
es and e, overlap, and any tigh(er constraints result from 
implicatures from background knowledge. 
The word "immediately* also presents a number of prob- 
lems. It requires its argument e to be an ordering relation 
between two entities z and g on some scale s. 
immediate(e} : (3 z, y, s)less-lhan'(e, z, It, s) 
It is not clear what the constraints on the scale are. Tem- 
poral and spatial scales are okay, as i• "immediately after 
'the alarm* and "immediately to the left', but the size gale 
is•'t: 
* John is immediately larger than Bill. 
Etymologically, it means that there are no intermediate 
entities between z and y on s. Thus, 
OP' e, z, y, s)immediate( e) ^ less-Shah'(e, z, 71, s) 
D -~(3z)less-than(z, z, s) ^ less-than(z, 7I, s) 
S/ B 
Figure I: The simplest space. 
However, this will only work if we r~trict z to be a relevant 
entity. For example, in the sentence 
We disengaged the compressor immediately after 
the alarm. 
the implication is that •o event that could damage the 
compressor occurred between the alarm and the disengage- 
ment, since the text is about equipment failure. 
3.4 Spaces and Dimenslon: The Minlmal 
Structure 
The notion of dimension has been made precise in linear al- 
|ebr4. Since the concept of a region is used metaphorically 
u well ms i• the spatial sense, however, we were concerned 
to determine the minimal structure that a system requires 
for it to make sense to call it a space of more than one 
dimension. For a two.dimensional space, tt~re must be a 
scale, or partial ordering, for each dimension. Moreover, 
the two scales must be independent, in that the order of 
elements o• one scale can not be determined from their 
order on the other. Formally, 
(~ el, h, <,, <,}seale,(s,, sp} ^ scale,(s,, sp) 
A o.dt.(<,,.,) A order(<,, s,) 
^(3.)(3y,)(z <, y, ^ • <, .,) 
^(3u,)(z <, m ^ ~ <, z) 
Note that this does •or allow <ffi to be simply the reverse of 
~t. A• u•surprising co•sequence of this definition is that 
the minima\] example of a two*dimensional space consists 
of three points (three points determine a plane}, e.g., the 
points A, B, ud C, where 
A <t B, A <t C, C <, A, A <z B. 
This is Illustrated in Figure 1. 
The dimensional scales are apparently found in all nat- 
• rat languages i• relevant domains. The familiar three- 
dimensional space of common sense is defined by the three 
scale pairs "up-down", "front-back", and "left-right'; the 
two*dimensional plane of the commonsense conception of 
the earth's surface is represented by the two scale pairs 
"north-south" and "east-west". 
131 
The simplest, although not the only, way to define ad- 
jacency in the space is as adjacency on both scales: 
(¥ z, y, sp)adj(z, y, sp) 
(B s,, .,)scale, (s,, sp) ^ sosle,(s:, sp) 
^adj(z,~,s,} ^ ad/(z, y, s,) 
A region is a subset of a space. 'I~he surface and interior of 
a region can be defined in terms of adjacency, in • manner 
paralleling the definition of a boundary in point-set topoi- 
og)'. In the following, s is the boundary or surface of • two- 
or three-dimensional region • embedded in a space sp. 
(vs, r}sur/'acc(s, r, •p) ~_ 
(Vz)z~ r D \[zes 
(EEy}(y £ sp ^ -,(y E r) A adj(z,y, sp))\] 
Finally, we can define the notion of "contact" in terms of 
points in different regions being adjacent. 
(Vr,, r,, sp)eontact(r, , r,, sp) --= 
disjoint(rl , r2) A 
(Ez, y}(z E r, A y E r. ^ adj(z, Thsp) ) 
By picking the scales and defining adjacency right, we 
can talk about points of contact between communicational 
networks, systems of knowledge, and other metaphorical 
domains. By picking the scales to be the real line and 
defining adjacency in terms of C-neighborhoods, we get Eu- 
clidean space and can talk about contact between physical 
objects. 
3.5 Material 
Physical objects and materials must be distinguished, just 
as they are apparently distinguished in every natural lan- 
guage, by means of the count noun - mass noun distinc- 
tion. A physical object is not a bit of material, but rather 
is comprised of a bit of material at any given time. Thus, 
rivers and human bodies are physical objects, even though 
their material constitution changes over time. This distinc- 
tion also allows us to talk about an object losing material 
through wear and still being the same object. 
We will say that an entity b is a bit of material by means 
of the expression material(b): Bits of material are char- 
acterized by both extension and cohesion. The primitive 
predication occupies(b, r, t) encodes extension, saying that 
• bit of material b occupies a region • at time t. The topol- 
ogy of a bit of material is then parasitic on the topology of 
the region it occupies. A part bl of • bit of material b is • 
bit of material whose occupied region is always • subregion 
of the region occupied by b. Point-like particles (particle) 
are defined in terms of points in the occupied region, dis- 
joint bits (disjointln't} in terms of disjointness of regions, 
and contact between bits in terms of contact between their 
regions. We can then state as follows the Principle of Non- 
Joint-Occupancy that two bits of material cannot occupy 
the same place at the same time: 
0' h, h)(di.jo~ntb~t (b,, h ) 
D (V z, ~, b., b4)i.tcrior(b,, b,) 
A interior(b4, &,) A particle(z, b,) 
A ~rtide(y, b4) 
-,(Ez)(ut(~, ~} ^ .t(y, ~)) 
At some future point in our work, this may emerge as a 
consequence of a richer theory of cohesion and force. 
The cohesion of materials is also a primitive property, 
for we must distinguish between a bump on the surface of 
u object tad • chip merely lying on the surface. Cohesion 
depends on • primitive relation bond between particles of 
material, paralleling the role of adj in regions. The relation 
attached is defined as the transitive closure of bond. A 
topology of cohesion is built up in a manner analogous 
to the topology of regions. In addition, we have encoded 
the relation that bond bears to motion, i.e. that bonded 
bits remain adjacent and that one moves when the other 
does, tad the relation of bond to force, i.e. that there is a 
characteristic force that breaks a bond' in a given material. 
Different materials react in different ways to forces of 
various strengths. Materials subjected to force exhibit or 
fail to exhibit several invariance properties, proposed by 
Hager (1985). If the material is shape-invariant with re- 
spect to • particular force, its shape remains the same. 
If it is topologically invariant, particles that are adjacent 
remain adjacent. Shape invariance implies topological in- 
variance. Subject to forces of a certain strength or de- 
gree dl, • material ceases being shape-invariant. At a 
force of strength d: > dl, it ceases being topologically 
iavaxiant, and at • force of strength d• _~ d:, it sim- 
ply break•. Metals exhibit the full range of possibilities, 
that is, 0 < dl < d: < dl < oo. For forces of strength 
d < dl, the material is "hard"; for forces of strength d 
where d~ < d < d,, it is "flexible*; for forces of strength 
d where d, < d < ds, it is "malleable". Words such as 
"ductile" and "elastic" can be defined in terms of this vo- 
cabulary, together with predicates about the geometry of 
the bit of material. Words such as "brittle" (d, = d, = da) 
ud "fluid" (d, = O, d, = co) can also be defined in these 
fermi. While w¢ should not expect to be able to define 
various material terms, like "metal" and "ceramic', we 
can certainly chanu:terize many of their properties with 
this vocabulary. 
Because of its iavariance properties, material interacts 
with containment tad motion. The word "clog" illustrates 
thil. The predicate clog is a three-place relation: z clogs 
agaiust the flow of z. It is the obstruction by z of :% 
motion through It, but with the selectional restriction that 
• must be something that can flow, such is a liquid, gas, 
or powder. If a rope is passing through a hole in a board, 
and • knot in the rope prevents it from going through, we 
do not say that the hole is clogged. On the other hand, 
there do not seem to be any selectional constraints on z. 
In particular, z can be identical with z: glue, sand, or 
molasses can clog a passageway against its own flow. We 
132 
can speak of clogging where the obstruction of flow is not 
complete, but it must be thought of as "nearly" complete. 
3.6 Other Domains 
3.6.1 Causal Connection 
Attachment within materials is one variety of caumd con- 
nection. In general, if two entities z and W are causally 
connected with respect to some behavior p of z, then when- 
ever p happens to z, there is some corresponding behavior 
q that happens to y. In the case of attachment, p and q 
are both move. A particularly common variety of causal 
connection between two entities is one mediated by the mo- 
tion of a third entity from one to the other. (This might 
be called a *vector boson* connection.) Photons medi- 
ating the connection between the sun and our eyes, rain 
drops connecting a state of the clouds with the wetness of 
our skin and clothes, a virus being transmitted from one 
person to another, and utterances passing between peo- 
ple are all examples of such causal connections. Barriers, 
openings, and penetration are all with respect to paths of 
causal connection. 
3.6.2 Force 
The concept of "force" is axiomatized, in a way consistent 
with Talmy's treatment (1985), in terms of the predica- 
tions force(a, b, dl ) and resist(b, a, d:)--a forces against b 
with strength dl and b resists a's action with strength d2. 
We can infer motion from facts about relative strength. 
This treatment can also be specialized to Newtonian force, 
where we have not merely movement, but acceleration. In 
addition, in spaces in which orientation is defined, forces 
can have an orientation, and a version of the Parallelogram 
of Forces Law can be encoded. Finally, force interacts with 
shape in ways characterized by words like "stretch*, "com- 
press", "bend*, "twist*, and "shear". 
3.6.3 Systems and Functionality 
An important concept is the notion of a "system", which 
is a set of entities, a set of their properties, and a set of 
relations among them. A common kind of system is one 
in which the entities are events and conditions and the 
relations are causal and enabling relations. A mechanical 
device can be described ~ such a system--in a sense, in 
terms of the plan it executes in its operation. The function 
of various parts and of conditions of those parts is then the 
role they play in this system, or plan. 
The intransitive sense of "operate', as in 
The diesel was operating. 
involves systems and functionality. If an entity z oper- 
ates, then there must be a larger system s of which z is 
a pap. t. The entity z itself is a system with parts. These 
parts undergo normative s~te changes, thereby causing z 
to undergo normative state changes, thereby causing z to 
produce an effect with a normative function in the larger 
system a. The concept of "normative* is discussed below. 
8.6.4 Shape 
We have been approaching the problem of characterizing 
shape from "a number of different angles. The classical 
treatment of shape is via the notion of "similarity* in Eu- 
clidean geometry, and in Hilbert's formal reconstruction of 
Euclidean geometry (Hilbert, 1902} the key primitive corn 
cept seems to be that of "congruent angles*. Therefore, 
we first sought to develop a theory of "orientation". The 
shape of an object can then be characterized in terms of 
changes in orientation of a tangent as one moves about on 
the surface of the object, as is done in vision research (e.g., 
Zahn and Roskies, 1972). In all of this, since "shape" can 
be used loosely and metaphorically, one question we are 
asking is whether some minimal, abstract structure can be 
found in which the notion of "shape* makes sense. Con- 
aider, for instance, a graph in which one scale is discrete, 
or even unordered. Accordingly, we have been examining 
* number of examples, asking when it seems right ;o say 
two structures have different shapes. 
We have also examined the interactions of shape and 
functionality (cf. Davis, 1984). What seems to be cru- 
cial is how the shape of an obstacle constrains the motion 
of a substance or of an object of a particular shape (cf. 
Shoham, 1985). Thus, a funnel concentrates the flow of a 
liquid, and similarly, a wedge concentrates force. A box 
pushed against a ridge in the floor will topple, and a wheel 
is, limiting case of continuous toppling. 
3.T Hitting, Abrasion, Wear, and Re- 
hated Concepts 
For z to hit If is for z to move into contact with y with 
some force. 
The basic scenario for an abrasive event is that there is 
u impinging bit of material m which hits an object o and 
by doing so removes a pointlike bit of material be from the 
surface of o: 
ebr-~r(e, m, o, be) : mat~-/./(m) 
A topolofficaily-invariant(o) 
(V e, m, O, bo)abr-~ent'(e, m, O, be) --= 
(3 t, b, a, ~,,e,. e,, e,).t(., t) 
^ ¢on,iatR-o$(o, b, t} ^ au,f.ce(s, b) 
A par~ide(~, s) ^ change'(c, st, "=) 
^ attacAed'(e,, be, b) ^ not ~ (e:, el ) 
^cause(ca, e) ^ hit'(ca, m, be) 
After the abrasive event, the pointlike bit b0 is no longer a 
part of the object o: 
133 
(Ve, m, o, be, e,, e:, t:)abr-e~ent'(e, m, o, be) 
^ changd(e, e,, e:} ^ attached'(el, be, b) 
Anot'(e~,ej) A at(e:,t:) 
^ consists-of(o, b:, t:) 
D -,part(bo, b:) 
It is necessary to state this explicitly since objects and bits 
of material can be discontinuous. 
An abrasion is a large number of abrasive events widely 
distributed through some nonpointlike region on the sur- 
face of an object: 
(Ve, m, o)abrad~(e, m, o) E 
(3bs}\[(Ve,)\[e, E e D 
(3be)be 6 bs A abr-eventJiet,m,o, bo)\] 
^ (V b, s, tHat(e, t) 
^ consists-of(o, b, t) ^ surface(s, b) 
D (3 r)subregion(r, S) 
^ widelpdistributed(bs, r)\]\] 
Wear can occur by means of a large collection of abrasive 
events distributed over time as well as space (so that there 
may be no time at which enough abrasive events occur to 
count as an abrasion). Thus, the link between wear and 
abrasion is via the common notion of abrasive events, not 
via a definition of wear in terms of abrasion. 
(re, m, o)wear'(e, z, o) =- 
(3bs}(Ve,)\[es • e D 
(3bo)be E bs} ^ abr-e~ent'(et,m,o, be)\] 
^ (3 i)\[interval(1) ^ wldelpdi.tributed(e, i)\] 
The concept "widely distributed" concerns systems. If 
z is distributed in tl, then I/ is • system tad z is • set 
of entities which are located at components of y. For the 
distribution to be wide, most of the elements of a partition 
of II determined independently of the distribution must 
contain components which have'elements of z at thelm. 
The word ``wear" is one of a large class of other events 
involving cumulative, gradual loss of material - events de- 
scribed by words like "chip*, "corrode', "file', "erode*, 
"rub*, "sand", "grind*, "weather", "rust', "tarnish', "eat 
• way*, "rot*, and "decay*. All of these lexica\] items can 
now be defined as variations on the definition of "wear*, 
since we have built up the axiomatizatioas underlying 
"wear". We are now in a position to characterize the en- 
tire class. We will illustrate this by defining two different 
types of variants of "wear* - "chip" and "corrode'. 
"Chip* differs from "wear" in three ways: the bit of 
material removed in one abrasive event is larger (it need 
not be point-like), it need not happen because of a mate- 
rial hitting against the object, and "chip* does not require 
(though it does permit) a large collection of such events: 
one can say that some object is chipped if there is only 
one .chip in it. Thus, we slightly alter the definition of 
abr-evenl to accommodate these changes: 
ire, m, o, be)chif (e, m, o, be} 
(3 t, b, s, be, e,, e:, e,)at(e, t) 
^consists-of(o, b, t) ^ surface(s, b) 
^ part(be, s) ^ changd(e, el, e:) 
^ attached'(el, be, b) A not'(e:, el ) 
"Corrode" differs from "wear* in that the bit of material 
is chemically transformed as well as being detached by the 
contact event; in fact, in some way the chemical transfor- 
mation causes the detachment. This can be captured by 
adding • condition to the abrasive event which renders it 
• (single) corrode event: 
corrode-event(m, o, be) : fluid(m) 
^contact(m, be) 
O's, m, o, be)corrode-~e.r(e, m, o, be) ~_ . . 
(3 t, b, s, be, e,, e,, e,)at(e, t) 
^ consists-of(o, b, t) ^ surface(s, b) 
^particle(be, a 0 ^ changd(e, el, e:) 
^attacheW(c,,bo, b) ^ not'(e:, e,) 
^cause(e,, e) ^ chemical-changd(e,, m, be) 
"Corrode* itself may be defined in a parallel fashion to 
"wear*, substituting corrode-event for abr-event. 
All of this suggests the generalization that abrasive 
events, chipping and corrode events all detach the bit in 
question, and that we may describe all of these as detach- 
tag events. We can then generalize the above axiom about 
abrasive events resulting in loss of material to the following 
axiom about detaching: 
(re, m, o, bo, b2, e,, e:, t:)detach'(e, m, o, be) 
^ changd(e, eh e:} ^ attached'(ct, be, b) 
^ not'(ez, e,) ^ at(e:, t:) 
^ Consists-of(o, b:, t:) 
D -,(part(be, b:)) 
4 Relevance and the Normative 
Many of the concepts we are investigating have driven us 
inexorably to the problems of what is meant by "relevant* 
and by "normative*. We do not pretend to have solved 
these problems. But for each of these concepts we do have 
the beginnings of an account that can play a role in anal- 
ysis, if not yet in implementation. 
Our view of relevance, briefly stated, is that something 
is relevant to some goal if it is a part of a plan to achieve 
that goal. \[A formal treatment of a similar view is given in 
Davies and Russell, 1986.) We can illustrate this with an 
example involving the word "sample*. If a bit of material 
z is a sample of another bit of material y, then z is a part 
of y, and moreover, there are relevant properties p and q 
such that it is believed that if p is true of z then q is true 
of y. That is, looking at the properties of the sample tells 
us something important about the properties of the whole. 
Frequently, p and q are the same property. In our target 
texts, the following sentence occurs: 
134 
We retained an oil sample for future inspection. 
The oil in the sample is a part of the total lube oil in the 
lube oil system, and it is believed that a property of the 
sample, such as "contaminated with metal particles', will 
be true of all of the lube oil as well, and that this will 
give information about po~ible wear on the bearings. It is 
therefore relevant to the goal of maintaining the machinery 
in good working order. 
We have arrived at the following provisional account of 
what it means to be "normative'. For an entity to exhibit 
a normative condition or behavior, it must first of all be a 
component of a larger system. This system has structure 
in the form of relations among its components. A pat- 
tern is a property of the system, namely, the property of 
• subset of these stuctural relations holding. A norm is a 
pattern which is established either by conventional stipula- 
tion or by statistical regularity. An entity is behaving in a 
normative fashion if it is a component of a system and in- 
stantiates a norm within that system. The word "operate" 
given above illustrates this. When we say that an engine 
is operating, we have in mind a larger system, the device 
the engine drives, to which the engine may bear various 
possible relations. A subset of these relations is stipulated 
to be the norm--the way it is supposed to work. We say 
it is operating when it is instantiating this norm. 
5 Conclusion 
The research we have been engaged in has forced us to ex- 
plicate a complex set of commonsense concepts. Since we 
have done it in as general a fashion as possible, we may 
expect that it will be possible to axiomatize a large num- 
ber of other areas, including areas unrelated to mechanical 
devices, building on this foundation. The very fact that we 
have been able to characterize words as diverse as "range', 
"immediately', "brittle', ~operate" and "wear" shows the 
promise of this approach. 
Acknowledgements 
The research reported here was funded by the Defense Ad- 
vanced Research Projects AGency under Office of Naval 
Research contract N00014-85-C-0013. It builds on work 
supported by NIH Grant LM03611 from the National Li- 
brary of Medicine, by Grant IST-8209346 from the Na- 
tional Science Foundation, and by a gift from the Systems 
Development Foundation. 
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