Incrementing Discourse with the Negation Relation 
Megan Moser 
University of Pittsburgh, LRDC 806 
3939 O'Hara Street 
Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA 
moser@pogo.isp.pit t.edu 
1 Negation as a relation 
Logical translations of English sentences typically 
translate sentential negation as a unary propositional 
operator. In this paper, I develop the processing aspect 
of a rather different ontological perspective on nega- 
tion: namely, negation as a two-place relation. The 
negation relation takes one argument, its associate, and 
relates it to the rest of the sentence which forms the sec- 
ond argument, its frame. The truth conditions of the 
relation are equivalent to those of the wide-scope unary 
operator. However, sentences with the same truth con- 
ditions may be logically distinct due to their distinct 
arguments to the relation. For example, (1) and (2) 
have identical truth conditions, but the distinct logical 
structures shown. 
(1) Ann didn't give TIlE INK to Bea 
\[n ¢\] \[a the ink I \[r Az(Ann gave z to Bea)l 
(2) Ann didn't give the ink to BEA 
\[n ¢~1 \[A Bea\] \[~, Ax(Ann gave the ink x)\] 
For the purposes here, sentential negation is a neg- 
ative element in auxiliary verb position, either the neg- 
ative infection n't or the free not in that position. Sen- 
tences with other negative forms are not under con- 
sideration, even tlmugh they may meet other defini- 
tions for seutential negation, e.g. those proposed by 
Klima (1964) and Jackeudoff (1969). 
The associate to negation may be distinguished 
from both stress-focus, a constituent which is marked 
by relative phonetic prominence, and information- 
focus, a constituent which conveys new information 
or makes the point of the utterance. Most commonly, 
information-focus and associates are marked by tile use 
of stress-focus, tlowever, all three of these things are 
often called "focus," suggesting an incorrect identifi- 
catimL The distinction is necessary because it is not 
the ease that information-focus or associates are always 
marked by stress-focus. 
Briefly, I compare the negation relation witlt two 
related proposals, that of lIorn (1989) and the Prague 
school (lIaji~ovll 1984, Sgall et al. 1986). lforn argues 
that tile Aristotelian system of predicate term logic, 
which analyzes negation as a mode of predication, is a 
more accurate formulation of linguistic negation. Ac- 
cording to this mode analysis, sentential negation ex- 
presses that the predicate does not hold of the subject 
for any reason, including, e.g., reference failures. As a 
result~ the mode analysis is identical in truth conditions 
to the unary propositional operator with wide scope. 
However, it is distinct ill structure. Tile mode analy- 
sis of negation involves a linking of two elements, sub- 
ject and predicate, to form a distinct kind of element, 
a sentence or proposition. This contrasts with unary 
negatiml which takes one element, its scope which is a 
proposition, and forms the same kind of element. Ill 
effect, the mode analysis claims that the scope of negw 
tion is structured as subject and predicate and that 
negation is a way to link these two pieces. 
Ill propositional logic, the unary operator is all ex- 
ternal connective, in the same category with and and 
or. 2~ruth fimctionally, it takes a single formula as an 
argument and inverts its truth value. In this logic, 
then, the affirmative is more basic than the negative 
because the negative takes the affirmative as an ar- 
gmnent. The affirmative may be formulated indepen- 
dently of the negative but not vice versa. Also, the 
unary negation may apply to the entire sentence to a 
subformula. Under the mode analysis, negation is not 
derivative on affirmation. Rather, the two form a cat- 
egory, the possible ways of linking subject and predi- 
cate. Also, the mode negation has a fixed scope. As 
support for the mode analysis over the unary analysis, 
Horn points out that negation does not iterate freely 
and that languages never have aegation in the exter- 
nal syntactic position which would suggest the unary 
operator. 
The relation analysis 1 am advocating is a gener- 
alization of the mode analysis. The negation relation 
links two pieces to form a sentence, but these two pieces 
are not constrained to be the subject and predicate. 
Without a stress-focus, negation relates subject and 
predicate. If there is a stress~focus, negation relates the 
ALTES DE COLING-92, NANTES, 23-28 AOt3"r 1992 3 1 7 PROC. OF COLING-92, NANTES, AUG. 23-28, 1992 
stress-focus to the rest of the sentence. The same argu- 
ments which support the mode analysis over the unary 
analysis also hold for the relation analysis. The nega- 
tion relation may select any constituent as its associate, 
a selection which also determines the frame. However, 
the truth conditions remain equivalent to those of a 
wide-scope unary operator; they do not vary with the 
different argument pairs. The negation relation intrO- 
duces a logical structure of two arguments. All the 
ways of selecting the arguments from a sentence will 
result in equivalent truth conditions. If we continue 
to use the term "scope" to mean the argument of the 
unary operator, the negation relation imposes a logical 
structure on the scope of the unary negation. 
Work in the Prague school on negation ( 
llajit2ov~. 1984, SgaU et al. 1986), explores the inter- 
action between negation and the information struc- 
ture. The framework developed by these authors cen- 
ters around the relationship of each utterance to the 
ongoing discourse. Communicative dynamism, a con- 
cept developed by Firbas, is a gradient property of a 
linguistic element, its ability to move the communica- 
tion forward. For this aspect of interpretation, the rep- 
resentation of the sentence is linearized so that all the 
elements of the sentence are arranged in a systematic 
ordering according to their communicative dynamism. 
With respect to this ranking of the elements of the 
sentence, a topic-focus articulation is defined which di- 
vides the sentence into a portion which is contextually 
bound and non-bound. Thus, while communicative dy- 
namism is gradient, there is a boundary in this order- 
ing, To the left of the boundary are the contextually 
bound elements of the topic and to the right of the 
boundary are the non-bound elements of the focus. The 
boundary has the same significance as the distinction 
between ground (= Praguean topic) and information- 
focus (-- Praguean focus) discussed in §3. This hound- 
ary is crucial to determining the scope of negation. 
Stated broadly, the central Praguean claim about 
negation is one which I am defending: "... it is primar- 
ily the relationship between \[ground\] and \[information- 
\]focus that is negated: In the unmarked ease, a neg- 
ative sentence states that its \[information-\]focus does 
not hold about its \[ground\]." (Sgall et al+ 1986:83). 
However, this work claims that the boundary between 
ground and information-focus defines the scope of nega- 
tion rather than an argument structure. The content 
in the ground falls outside the scope of negation and 
so will be logically entailed. Wide scope negation is, 
for these authors, only possible when a sentence lacks 
a ground. Contrary to this claim, negation can have 
wider scope than something in ground. In (3), every 
dog is clearly contextually hound, yet it is inside the 
scope of the negation. 
(3) Who walked every dog? 
Ricki didn't walk every dog 
(4) Who didn't Ricki give A noNE to? 
Ricki didn't give a bone to IlER DOG 
One difference between tile relation analysis and the 
others mentioned is that negation can have an associate 
which is independent of stress-focus or information- 
focus. For example, in (4), negation has the direct 
object as its associate, while the indirect object is the 
information-focus and a stress-focus. The negation re- 
lation in this example is embedded in another relation- 
associate-frame structure. These examples will not be 
of concern here. 
2 Semantic analysis 
Besides negation and affirmation, focus particles such 
as only and even express relations between an associate 
and frame. Here I summarize the unified semantic anal- 
ysis of these particles given by Moser (1992b). To be- 
gin with, consider only and its interaction with stress- 
focus. A variation in stress-focus in an only sentence 
can lead to different truth conditions. Note the differ- 
ent truth conditions for (5) and (6). Since there is no 
discernible difference between a stress-focus in an only 
sentence and one in another context, this systematic 
effect of stress-focus on truth-conditions supports the 
inclusion of stress-focus as part of the formal structure 
of any sentence, as argued for by Klein (1991) and as 
will be assumed here. Stress-focus is effectively a struc- 
tural feature along with the position features, the more 
traditional structural features relating to placement in 
a syntax tree. There is a formal difference between 
two sentences which have exactly the same sequence 
of words based on how they are stressed, a difference 
which is realized by a particular prosodic feature, that 
of stress. Thus, (5) and (6) are not the same sentence 
with different intonation, rather, they are formally dif- 
ferent sentences. 
In addition to a stress-focus associate, only may oc- 
cur without a stress-focus as in (7). In these eases, 
its associate is the adjacent constituent. The relation 
analysis applies independently of how oaly's associate 
is determined, through position or stress. The same ob- 
servations hold true for the associate of negation, but 
without the truth conditional consequences noted for 
(5) and (6). 
(5) Ann only gave Trim INK to Bea 
\[1~ unique-El \[A ink\] \[F Ax(Ann gave z to Bea)\] 
(6) Ann only gave the ink to BEA 
\[a unique-El \[a Bea\] \[e Ax(inn gave ink to x)\] 
(7) Ann gave only the ink to BEA 
Acq'ns DE COLING-92, NANTES, 23-28 AOt3T 1992 3 1 8 PROC. OF COLING-92. NANTES, AUG. 23-28, 1992 
A relation and its associate, regardless of whether 
determined by position or stress, may be viewed as 
structuring the logical proposition. That is, the 
relation-associate-frame structure is a formal object, 
an instaBce of the structured meanings discussed by 
Cresswell (1985) and yon Stechow (1988). Tile inter- 
pretation of these relation-associate-frame structures is 
a three step process. First, a set of alternatives to the 
associate is determined. These alternatives are things 
which are similar to the associate in contextually rele- 
vant ways. To determine tile alternatives, the relevant 
syntactic-semantic type is inferred from the ~sociate. 
Then, starting from the instances of this type, there 
may be further contextual restrictions on the members 
of the alternatives. For (5), the syntactic-semantic type 
might be art supplies. Then, tile context could be re- 
strictive so that only the ink and paint are in tile set 
of alternatives. The second step in the interpretation 
is that tile frame is used to select a subset of these al- 
ternatives, call it the frame set. In this case, the frame 
set will be the subset of tile alternative supplies which 
Ann gave Bea. Third, the only relation nmst hold be- 
tween the associate and the frame set in order for the 
sentence to be true. For (5) to be true, the frame set, 
those art supplies which Ann gave to Bea, will have the 
ink as their uniqBe element. 
The two-place relations expressed by focus particles 
do not have their arguments rigidly typed. Rather, the 
associate may be of any semantic type and the frame 
will be a set of elements of that type. Semautically, 
these particles deuote element-to-set relations. Defin- 
ing them this way allows for all associate that is either 
a stress-focus or an adjacent constituent. The general 
definition of focus-particles as element-to-set relations 
raises the question of how the associate, the element 
argument to the relation, is determined. The answer 
l suggest is that the position of the focus particle de- 
termines an environment for the associate. Then, the 
associate will be the closest stress-focus in that envi- 
ronment or it will be the entire environment. Thus, 
the syntactic relationslfip between particle and asso- 
ciate, stress and locality all play a role in determining 
tile associate of a focus particle. 
3 Information structure 
In this section, I note the similarity between the 
relation-associate-frame structure just discussed and 
information structure. Conceptually, information 
structure is the differentiation of the content of a 
sentence according to tile speaker's beliefs about tile 
heater's knowledge or current awareness. Chafe (1976) 
describes this in terms of the metaphor of packaging, 
noting that the same logical content can be packaged iu 
various ways depending on what it is being used for. In- 
formation structure is a kind of non-truth-conditional 
meaning which is inherently pragmatic because it is 
defined with reference to speaker, hearer and context. 
However, while the meaning conveyed involves contex- 
tual factors, it does not follow that tile means of con- 
veying it does. That is, while information structure ex- 
presses how a sentence fits in tile context, it is possible 
that context is not a factor in determining the informa- 
tion structure itself. Recent work by Vallduvl (1990) 
suggests that information structure lie viewed as one 
aspect of the fornlal structure of a sentence, on a par 
with predicate-argument structure and logical form. 
'/'he major constituents of information structure are 
the information-focus, the portion of content which the 
speaker deems will be informative or will make the 
point of the sentence, and the ground, the remainder of 
the content wltich is assumed to be uncontroversial and 
serves ms a vehicle for the information-focus. As a sub- 
part, the ground contains the link, tile particular entity 
which the utterance is about. The features which mark 
the information-focus are the same position and stress 
features described for determining aLL associate. In fact, 
in Moser (1992a), I propose the major constituents of 
information structure be extended to include a rela- 
tion between information-focus and ground, making it 
a tripartite structure. As evidence for this extension, I 
note the tendency of negation and only to accompany 
the information-focus in constructions which mark in- 
formation structure by placing tile information-focus in 
an isolated position. Thus, information structure is an 
instance of a relation-associate-frame structure. 
While the structure and formal marking of infor- 
mation structure are identical to the relation struc- 
tures already discussed, the interpretation is not. The 
semantic interpretation by generating alternatives, se- 
lecting a frame set and checking the relation between 
associate and frame set expresses nothing about the 
hearer's awareness. Instead, information strncture is all 
additional interpretation of a relation structure, made 
simtdtaneously with the semantic one. Vallduvi pro- 
poses that the pragmatic interpretation of information 
structure is effectively instructions to the hearer for 
updating mental lilt cards for the entities in the dis- 
course. Here I take a slightly ditferent perspective, i.e. 
that tile instructions are concerned with updating a file 
card representation which is external to the discour~ 
participants. 
The link specifies the address at which the informa- 
tion of the utterance is to be stored, so its pragmatic 
interpretation is a ¢~O-TO instruction. The ground 
specifies content which is currently known or under 
discussion, a command to RETRIEVE all open propo- 
sition front a file card. Finally, I modify Vallduvi's 
instructions to allow for a relation constituent as part 
of information structure. Rather than SUBSTITUTE tile 
information-focus into the ground, the more general 
Ac'Yzs nE COLING-92, NANTES, 23-28 Aofrr 1992 3 1 9 PROC. OF COLING-92, NAIwrEs, AUG. 23-28, 1992 
RELATE information-focus to ground using a specific 
relation is used. Consider the example in (8). Each 
constituent of information structure is interpreted by 
an instruction; the link is used to locate a file card, 
the ground is used find an open proposition which is 
expected to be there, and the information-focus is used 
to fill in the open proposition depending on what re- 
lation is specified. The result is a single, unstructured 
proposition on the appropriate file card. If the infor- 
mation structure used to convey this proposition were 
different, the file card update would be done differently, 
although the same proposition would result. 
(8) The girls published THE BOOK 
\[R E\]\[a the book\] \[v \[L the girls\] published x\] 
(i) GO-To(the girls) 
(ii) RETRIEVE(_ published x) 
(iii) RELATE(E, the book, x) 
There are two ways in which these instructions are 
inadequate. First, the ground may require distinct in- 
terpretations depending on the syntactic construction 
used. Prince (1986) discusses a variety of construc- 
tions which mark an open proposition as presupposed. 
The different constructions vary in the way their open 
proposition is presupposed, however. Second, this is 
a literal interpretation of information structure which 
does not address the more complex possibilities for its 
interaction with the context. 
4 Discourse incrementation 
The representation of the ongoing discourse has the 
structure of a set of file cards. One file card is main- 
tained for each entity under discussion, a catalogue 
of the predications made about that entity. The dis- 
course content which is being negotiated is the sum 
of information on all the file cards. File cards are a 
metaphor for a particular organization of information, 
one which has been independently suggested by authors 
concerned with several areas of inquiry in cognitive sci- 
ence. Each file card is arranged with two parts: (i) a 
marker or index, an element of pure reference distinct 
from any particular predication about the entity, and 
(ii) a list of unstructured propositions, either affirma- 
tive or negative. 
Ina file card representation of discourse, there is a 
natural distinction between the function of NPs, which 
pick out file cards, and the function of the sentence 
which NPs are embedded in, which specify predica- 
tions to go on the file cards. For each NP in an ut- 
terance, a file card is activated, i.e. associated with a 
discourse marker with the predicates contained in the 
NP. The rules for this activation make use of the NP's 
form as pronoun, definite or indefinite, and will not be 
discussed here. The distinction between the NP func- 
tion as file card activators and the rest of the sentence 
as adding predications to the file card is a kind of pro- 
cessing distinction. No difference in truth conditions 
arise from the autonomy of file card activation. How- 
ever, Prince (1990) suggests some linguistic evidence 
for this processing distinction. In Moser (1992a), I sug- 
gest that this distinction in negative sentences may help 
account for the tendency of referring expressions to be 
understood as outside the scope of negation. Negative 
sentences followed by a denial of existence are argued 
to be cases of constructing file cards for entities which 
do not exist. 
Once the file cards are activated, the process of their 
updating takes the structured proposition and enters 
the appropriate fact(s) (=unstructured proposition) on 
the activated file cards. In the process of this updating, 
the pragmatic interpretation of tile relation structure 
as information structure arises and may produce infer- 
ences which connect to the preceding discourse. The 
result of this updating must be at least the appropriate 
entries on the file cards to reflect the semantics of the 
sentence. A model theoretic semantics for a file card 
representation of discourse is defined by Helm (1982) in 
terms of a function for embedding the set of file cards 
in a model. Assuming this embedding function, tile 
truth conditions of relation structures are sufficiently 
specified by entries on the file cards. 
Example (9) will be used to illustrate discourse in- 
crementation. Since the activation of file cards takes 
place independently, the structured proposition fur the 
increment is (10). Assume that the file cards for the 
context are as shown in Figure 1. First, a set of alter- 
natives to the information-focus is constructed. Recall 
that this consists of a set of contextually relevant things 
which match the associate (=information-focus) in se- 
mantic type. In this example, the set in (11) will be 
derived. The update to file cards may require these al- 
ternatives. Based on the earlier discussion, the initial 
formulation of the update is the set of instructions in 
(12). The GO-TO instruction specifies that the file card 
to be updated is d2 and will not be of further concern 
here. 
(9) WWII Veteran's description of Germans' surren- 
der to his battalion by the EIbe River: 
They swam lhe river lo surrender to us 
thousands of then*- 
They didn't want to surrender to TRE RUSSIANS 
(10) \[n ¢1 \[a d41 \[~ ax (\[L as\] want t .... r. to~)\] 
(11) {the Russians, the British, the Americans} 
(12) (i) Co-To(d2) 
(ii) RETRIEVE(_. want to surrender to x) 
(iii) R\]~LATE(~, d4, x) 
A~ DE COLING-92, NAN'rEs, 23-28 ^OUT 1992 3 2 0 PROC. oF COLING-92, NANTES, AUO. 23-28, 1992 
dl 
S's battalion __ 
d~ 
Germans __ 
__ SWaIU river to sure to Ill 
thousands of __ 
Figure 1: File cards prior to incrementation with (9) 
Speaking generally, the update instructions express 
a literal information structure interpretation. That is, 
retrieving the ground from tile prior discourt~e or from 
the healer's knowledge store and supplying a value for 
its variable correspond closely with the questiml test 
whidl is often cited ,as a diagnostic for information- 
focus. The ground is that part of the utterance which 
cordd have been all inunediately preceding question and 
the information-focus is the answer to that question. 
For example, (13) could answer the question shown 
but not (14). Providing the answer to a question is a 
very literal characterization of being informative. How- 
ever, the content of the information-focus is perhaps 
not directly informative and the content of the ground 
is perhaps not directly known. Instead, in virtue of 
being presented ,as information-focus and ground, the 
function of these two constituents may be achieved in- 
directly through inferencing. Content which is pre- 
sented as informative \[nay give rise to inferences which 
make it informative. Similarly for tile ground, infer- 
ences may arise which transform unknown content into 
known content because the information was presented 
by ttle speaker as being known. Given tile literal inter- 
pretation of information-focus and ground, and given 
particular content which is inconsistent with this lit- 
eral interpretation, hearers will repair the discrepancy 
through inferencing. Another way to state this point is 
that ttle information-focus conteat, the ground content 
and perhaps the relation will support distinct kinds of 
inferences. This is the central idea of Wilson and Sper- 
her (1979). 
(13) Who did they surrender to? 
They surrendered to TIlE ~USSIANS 
(14) Who surrendered to tile t~ussians? 
As was mentioned, the ground is an open proposi- 
tion which may be presupposed in a variety of senses. 
Prince (1986) mentions several distinct kinds of presup- 
position which arise front various syntactic construe- 
tions: explicit in prior discourse, inferrable from prior 
discourse, currently ill hearer's consciousness alld gen- 
erally known. The retrieval of an open proposition from 
a file card, discussed earlier as tile interpretation of 
ground, corresponds only to tile first kind of presup- 
position. One modification required, theu, is that the 
retrieval should be from a particular source depend- 
ing on the construction used, either from the file cards, 
from the hearer's awareness or from tile hearer's general 
knowledge. Assume that these other sources are avail- 
able and are also structured as tile cards. Further, as- 
sume that tile ground of canonical sentences such as (9) 
shmdd be retrieved as inferrable from prior discourse.. 
For this example, the retrieval will be successful. Tile 
prior discourse estalfiishes that the Germans were sur- 
rendering to the speaker's battalion and from this it 
call be inferred that who they wanted to surrender to 
is under discussion. 
Ill many cases, the retrieval of the open proposi- 
tion front the required source fails. The simplest way 
to address tile failure is accommodation (Lewis 1979), 
adding tile cxpeeted ground to the source. In some 
cases~ accommodation is not appropriate anti an infer- 
ence nlust be made to connect the ground to the source. 
These inferences arise from the grormd content heeansc 
it is intended to be recognized a~s the grmmd, i.e. as a 
restatement of or a connection to the discourse context. 
\[u (15) (adapted from the Brown corpus), for in- 
stauce, a news conlrnentator suggests the sarcastic re- 
ply to Khrushchev. As shown in (16), the subject is 
the informatiun-focus. The literal interpretation of the 
ground is that someone playing the marimba with his 
shoes ill tile UN is retrievable as inferrable from the 
prior discourse. This retrieval will fail. Accommo- 
dating the failure would add marimba playing to the 
discourse as if it had been discussed earlier. But this 
action cannot be construed as being under discussion. 
Because playing the marimba with shoes is marked ms 
being under discussion, it requires an inference to con- 
nect it with what actually is under discussion, con- 
frontations with Khrl, shdmv. Marimba playing must 
be recognized as a metaphor for table banging. In or- 
tier to make sense of this comment, the hearer recog- 
nizes, in virtue nfthe fact that it is presented as ground 
contest and it cannot be accounnodated, that he does 
know of an incident which could be described that way. 
The hearer will make the analogy between playing the 
marimba and banging on the table with a shoe and 
then accounnodate the ground by assuming that the 
shoe hanging incident is under discussion. 
(15) Khrushchev: l'bols! What do you think you are 
doing? 
Cornmenta~or: WE aren't playing the marimba 
with our shoes in the United Natioas 
(16) \[R q\] \[A we\] \[,.. Ax (x play the n,arimba etc.)\] 
This discussion suggests sew~ral components needed 
to interpret the ground. Since wlmt is on the file cards 
are simple propositions rather than open propositions, 
it nmst be specitled what it means to retrieve an open 
t)roposition from the file card. "file simplest view to 
adopt is that it will be a proposition which matches the 
open one, except that the. variable is instantiated with 
AcrEs DE COLING-92, NAN'rES, 23-28 nour 1992 3 2 1 PROC, OF COLING-92, NANTES, AUG. 23-28, 1992 
one of the alternatives or a general term such as some- 
thing. What is inferrable from prior discourse needs 
to be specified. Further, a mechanism for rejecting ac- 
commodations and inferring another ground is needed. 
With these components, the ground is interpreted by: 
*RETRIEVE ground from source 
(source specified by construction) 
*if that fails, accommodate ground 
*if that fails, infer other ground and accommodate it 
The semantics of the information-focus and its re- 
lation to ground are reflected as one or more entries on 
the file card. One entry will be, in either polarity, the 
proposition formed by substituting the information- 
focus into the ground. The polarity of this entry and 
what other entries should be made depend on the re- 
lation. The affirmative and negative relations specify 
the single entry in different polarities, while the only 
relation specifies an entry for each alternative to the 
information-focus. Using examples which minimally 
contrast with (9), the file card entries are in (17)-(19). 
(17) They wanted to surrender to TIlE RUSSIANS 
_ want to surrender to d4 
(18) They didn't want to surrender to THE RUSSIANS 
"~_ want to surrender to d4 
(19) They only wanted to surrender to TIlE I:~USSIANS 
_ want to surrender to d4 
-~_ want to surrender to dn (=tile British) 
-1_ want to surrender to dn (=the Americans) 
(20) They even wanted to surrender to TIlE RUSSIANS 
\[R least-likely, non-unique-~\]\[a d4\] 
\[r Ax(d2 want to surrender to ~)\] 
In addition to these logical entries, there are 
two kinds of impiicatures based on the relation of 
information-focus to ground. Becanse implicatures do 
not affect truth conditions, they are special entries on 
the file cards. That is, the embedding fimetion which 
determines whether the discourse is true in a model 
must ignore the special implicature entries. First, con- 
ventional implicatures are contributed by focus parti- 
cles sudl a.s even or also. These particles are analyzed 
as urodifiers or comments on the logical relation. Even, 
for example, contributes the two modifiers shown in 
(20). As a result, one regular and two special entries 
go on the d2 file card. Second, scalar implicatures 
(Ilirschberg 1985) may relate the alternatives to the 
frame. Contextual factors determine whether scalar 
implicatures should be generated. For instance, if the 
alternatives are ranked in a relevant way, then it is 
implicated that stronger values than the associate do 
not hold. Or, if the relation of the alternatives to the 
ground is salient, then it is implicated that the alterna- 
tives instantiate the ground with opposite polarity. For 
example, (21) has the information structure shown in 
(22). The alternatives to the associate will be the set 
in (23). The relation of the alternatives to the ground 
has been explicitly questioned, and so ttle implication 
that the alternatives cannot instantiate the ground will 
arise. 
(21) Q: Do you have Lana Moro or Bernat yarns? 
A: We have CASSINO 
(cited in Hirsehberg 1985:58) 
(22) \[n El \[a Cassino\] \[F ),x(we have x)\] 
(23) {Lana M .... Bernat, Ca.ssino) 
Now consider the pragmatic component of relating 
the information-focus to the ground. Pragmatically, 
tile interpretation is as the informative content. As 
was noted earlier, the notion of informativeness ex- 
pressed by the update instructions is too literal for all 
eases. It is the same notion which underlies the ques- 
tion test as a diagnostic for information-focus. Under 
this analysis, the earlier example has the information 
structure it does because it could be used to answer 
the question in (24). Arguably, however, it is being 
used to answer the question in (25). The literal view 
of information-focus must be extended from supplying 
an unknown value to making the point of the utter- 
ance, which may require inferencing ( Wilson and Sper- 
bet 1979). In some cases, the point will be to supply the 
hearer with a previously unknown value (or non-value) 
to the ground. In other cases, the information-focus 
may be literally uninformative and motivate inferences. 
While the general mechanism which generates the in- 
ferences that supply tile point of the utterance from 
the relation and information-focus is ill-understood, it 
is related to the inferences that specify the coherence 
relations discussed by Hobbs (1985) and Mann and 
Thompson (1987). That is, making the point of the 
utterance overlaps with making the utterance coherent 
with the immediately previous discourse. 
(24) Who did they want to surrender to 9. 
They didn't want to surrender to THE RUSSIANS 
(25) Why did they swim the river to surrender to us? 
One fairly well-understood class of these inferences 
is the scalar implicatures mentioned above. Note that 
the exchange in (21) is entirely felicitous in a set- 
ting where the clerk stands in front of a conspicuous, 
clearly marked display of Cassino yarn. The alternative 
brand's filling the open proposition is marked as infor- 
mative, although in the assumed setting it cannot pos- 
sibly be literally informative. The information-focus 
does not directly provide the information requested. 
Therefore, the customer infers that this was marked as 
the point because it is the most the clerk could say. 
Tile customer, based on the information-focus content 
Acr~ DE COLING-92, NANTES, 23-28 ^ofrr 1992 3 2 2 PROC. OF COLING-92, NANTES, AUG. 23-28, 1992 
and the fact that it was marked as information-focus, 
infers that the direct answer to her question is negative. 
In short, the relation-a.ssociate-frame structures 
which underlie sentences receive both a semantic and 
a pragmatic interpretation in the procesa of discourse 
increment ation. The truth conditions are expressed a~ 
a list of predications on tile cards. The pragmatic in- 
terpretation has both a literal and au extended ver- 
sion. The literal interpretation is that the ground is 
under discussion and the information-focus' relation to 
it is informative. When the content of the information 
structure constituents cannot be construed this way in 
a particular context, the pragmatic interpretation is ex- 
tended through inferencing. Front this perspective, the 
information structure serves the function of differenti- 
ating the total content into increments of information 
for the purpose of inferencing. Given an utterance of 
the same basic sentence in the same context, a shift in 
its information-focus will affect the iufereuces it sup- 
ports. 
AcrEs DE COLING-92, NANTES, 23-28 AOI~'r 1992 3 2 3 PROC. OF COLING-92, NANTES, AUG. 23-28, 1992 

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