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<Paper uid="W01-1604">
  <Title>Against the Identification of Anaphora and Presupposition</Title>
  <Section position="1" start_page="0" end_page="0" type="abstr">
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Abstract
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    <Paragraph position="0"> Since van der Sandt and Geurts have put forward and extensively applied the notion of a fundamental identity of presupposition and anaphora, something like a universal consensus seems to have developed that this view is basically correct. Supposing that it is, and further supposing that it entails an empirical hypothesis, there are a number of facts that have so far remained unaccounted for. This paper presents some of these facts and argues that more differentiated notions of anaphora and presupposition may well be more fruitful for further research in the semantics-pragmatics interface.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="1"> Introduction Since van der Sandt &amp; Geurts (1991), van der Sandt (1992) and Geurts (1995, 1999) have put forward the notion of a fundamental identity of presupposition and anaphora, a fairly universal consensus seems to have developed that this view is basically correct. Assuming that this notion is intended to have empirical consequences I shall refer to this view in the following as the 'Presupposition is Anaphora Hypothesis', for short: the PIA hypothesis.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="2"> There is surely no doubt that phenomena of presupposition and anaphora are not unrelated. Understanding anaphora quite conventionally as a way of resuming a previously established reference more or less involves the assumption that this reference has actually been established beforehand and in this sense is presupposed. In this rough and general sense anaphora is presuppositional.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="3"> Conversely, in presupposing that one or the other proposition is true, a relation is established to something that either was said before, follows from something that was said before, or at least could reasonably have been said before; and this relation may in some rough and general sense be called anaphorical.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="4"> Now Geurts and van der Sandt do not stay at a rough and general level, but turn these relations between anaphora and presupposition into a venerable theory of presupposition that yields certain technical advantages for the treatment of presupposition when it is implemented in (a variety of) Discourse Representation Theory (van der Sandt (1992) and Geurts (1995, 1999)). I shall argue below that despite this technical progress the PIA hypothesis obscures both the notion of presupposition and the notion of anaphora. The Procrustean relationship actually harms our understanding of both phenomena. At the same time, I shall argue, the Hypothesis is empirically wrong with respect to linguistic data. I shall start with the latter.</Paragraph>
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