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<Paper uid="W93-0226">
  <Title>Intentions, hffornla,tion, and Inference: Two Rhetorical Questions</Title>
  <Section position="1" start_page="0" end_page="98" type="abstr">
    <SectionTitle>
1 Introduction
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    <Paragraph position="0"> Moore and Pollack \[1992:540\], following Grosz and Sidner \[1986:201\] point to the possibility that interpreters can often infer intentional relations fi'om informational relations, and vice versa. I originally intended to explore the nn.ture of these inferences in the framework of SDRT and DICE, and show how they go through in some cases, but not in others) The details of this modelling turn out to be interesting, 1)ut not wholely surprising. I will theretbre take the inference-based model for granted, and pose instea.d two rhetorical qttesl.ions that arose whelL working it out. The questions are: first, when is an intentionM relation not a.n intentional r(da.tion? And secondly, when is an inforinational relation not an ilfforma,tional rela, tion?  2 A question of intention (1) Nobody seems to ca.re al)ont any modern poet nowadays except .lohn Betjema,n, who writes agreeably in praise of buttered toast and railway sta.tions, and bet:ame a best seller almost By Appointment after Princess Margaret said she liked his verse. \[LOB A19:122 null *The support of the Science ;rod Engineering Research Council through projt:ct lllllllbel: GR/G22077 is gratefully acknowledged. HCRC is supported by the Econontic and Social Research Council. My thanks to R.obert Dale, Alex L;mcarides and Johanna Moore for helpfifl discussions. Email: J.0berlander~ed.ac.uk IOn SDKT, see Asher \[1993\]; on COltllllOltSel|Se Entailment, see Asher and Morreau \[1991\]; on DICE itself, see I,;Lscaridcs and Asher \[1991\] or most recently, L;LuC/:;tridcs and Oberlamler \[1993\].</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="1">  (2) a. Betjeman writes agreea, bly in pra,ise of buttered toast a.nd railway stations, b. and became a best seller a.hnost By Appointment c. after Princess Margaret said she liked his verse.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="2">  Which relations hold between the elements of (2)? If we are interested ill tile domain of time and causality, the informationM relations are easy enough: the eventuality of (2a,) temporally overlaps with those of both (21)) and (2c); (2b)'s event temporally succeeds (2c)'s, a.nd is caused by it. But which intentionM relations hohl between thenV, t In Lascarides and Oberlander \[1993\], we analysed the l)resuppositiomd beha.vi()ur of temporal connectives like after, and proposed a. model ill which subordinate cla.us(,s like (2(:) a.re accomntodated via discourse attachment. As usual, various defeasil)le inferences go through, aad the conclusion is that the following discourse relations hold between the SDR.Ss: Backg,vund(2a., 2c), Narlution(2c, 2b), and Result(2c, 2b). Notice: the inference process delivers not one hut l',,o discourse relations holding between (21)) and (2c). So it, seems tha.t we have gone a. step further than Moore and Pollack: we not only agree with their Mullih'vrl cla.im; we a,lso go on to make a, Multirchttion cla,im: more than one intentiona.l-level r(,la, ti(m ca.n simulta.neously hohl Imtween l.w(~ discourse segments. In response, one could invent a new discourse relation, Narratiou'n'Rt'.~ull, which wouhl hohl in just these cases. But its tack of independent motiva.tion, a.nd its resemblance to Knott ~rn(I Dale's \[1992:7\] inform-accidcnt-and-mcntion-fi'uit rela.tion is undermining. Alteruately, one could argue that the multiplicity of discourse relations arises because we alrea.dy have too many intentional relations, rather than too few. On this account, we should dipose of (sa.y) Result, and make do with the intentionM relation Narration, and various informational rela.tions, like cause, to cover the cases. There is something to be said for this view, but I won't say it here.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="3"> Rather, I would defend the Multirela.tion cla.im by observing that it is the ua.tural concomita.nt of the multiple intentions served by single segments of discourse. We entertain as welt as describe; impress as well as convince. Grosz and Sidner \[198{i:178\] 1)oint out that the a,ssumption that each segment has but one purpose will &amp;quot;in the end prove too strong&amp;quot;. So segments serve multil)le orthogonal goals; and this means that a. segment ma.y Ih.ll into multiple rela.tionships, (,v(,n with a single other segment.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="4"> Thus, it shouhl be no surl)rise tha.t a. discourse sl.ru(:tllre tlmoi'y can (hdiver m.r~, tha.n one intentiona.l relation holding between two discourse segments. Indeed, on this stt~ry, it. is much more surprising that some theories do not.</Paragraph>
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