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<Paper uid="W00-1010">
  <Title>Social Goals in Conversational Cooperation</Title>
  <Section position="8" start_page="91" end_page="92" type="concl">
    <SectionTitle>
6 Conclusions
</SectionTitle>
    <Paragraph position="0"> In this paper we proposed an intention-based approach to dialog that aims at overcoming the critics posed by (Traum and Allen, 1994) by assuming the existence of social goals. Our solution does not rest on an explicit notion for example, B could missing the train.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="1"> of obligation, even if some similarities can be found with (Traum and Allen, 1994). The advantage of not resorting to a primitive notion of obligation is to have a uniform source of motivations for explaining the behavior of agents.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="2"> With respect to approaches which stipulate a primitive notion of obligation, here, the same phenomena are accounted for without introducing further propositional attitudes.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="3"> This explanation of the motivations leading to cooperation provides an explicative model that is uniform with the treatment of deontic reasoning in agent theories (Conte et al., 1998), (Boella and Lesmo, 2000) and the definition of cooperation proposed in (Boella et al., 2000).</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="4"> It is clear that, by reducing the number of propositional attitudes, the reasoning process becomes more complex, but our model is aimed at constituting an explanation, and it does not exclude the possibility of compiling the reasoning in more compact form: as (Brown and Levinson, 1987) notice, %here is a rational basis for conventions, too&amp;quot;.</Paragraph>
  </Section>
class="xml-element"></Paper>