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<Paper uid="P81-1028">
  <Title>PROBLEMS IN LOGICAL FORM</Title>
  <Section position="13" start_page="122" end_page="123" type="concl">
    <SectionTitle>
NOTES
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    <Paragraph position="0"> I Although our immediate aim is to construct a theory of natural-language processing rather than truth-conditional semantics, It is worth noting that a system of logical form wlth a well-deflned semantics constitutes a bridge between the two projects. If we have a processing theory that associates English sentences with their logical forms, and if those loKical forms have a truth-~ondltional semantics, then we will have specified the semantics of the English sentences as well.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="1"> 2 In other papers (e.g., \[Montague, 1974b\]), Montague himself uses an intenslonal logic in exactly the role we propose for logical form--and for much the same reason: 'We could ... introduce the semantics of our fraKment \[of English\] directly; but It Is probably mere perspicuous to proceed indirectly by (I) setting up a certain simple artificial language, that of tensed Intenslonal logic, (2) giving the semantics of that language, and (3) interpreting English indirectly by showing in a rigorous way how to translate it into the artificial language. This Is the procedure we shall adopt;...&amp;quot; \[Montague, 1974b, p.256\].</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="2">  unpublished paper on demonstratives \[Kaplan, 1977\], calls the content of a sentence, as opposed to Its character. Kaplan introduces the content/character distinction to sort out puzzles connected wlth the use of demonstratives and Indaxlcals. He notes that there are at least two different notions of &amp;quot;the meaning of a sentence&amp;quot; that conflict when indexical expressions are used. If A says to B, &amp;quot;I am hungry,&amp;quot; and g says to A, &amp;quot;~ am hungry,&amp;quot; they have used the same words, but in one sense they mean different things. After all, it may be the case that what A said is true and what B said is false. If A says to g, &amp;quot;~ am hungry,&amp;quot; and B says to A, &amp;quot;You are hungry,&amp;quot; they have used different words, but mean the same thing, that A is hungry. This notion of &amp;quot;meaning different things&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;meaning the same thing&amp;quot; is one kind of meaning, which Kaplan calls &amp;quot;content.&amp;quot; There Is another sense, though, In which A and g both use the words &amp;quot;I am hungry&amp;quot; with the same meanlng, namely, that the same rules apply to determine, in context, what content is expressed. For thls notion of meaning, Kaplan uses the term &amp;quot;character.&amp;quot; Kaplan's notion, therefore, is that the rules of the language determine the character of a sentence--whlch, in turn, together wlth the context of utterance, determines the content. If ~ broaden the scope of Kaplan's theory to include the local pragmatic indetermlnacles we have discussed, it seems Chec the way they depend on context would also be part of the character of a sentence and Chat our logical form is thus a representation of the content of the sentence-ln-context.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="3"> 5 It should be obvious from the example that nouns referring to unlCs of measure--e.g., &amp;quot;feet&amp;quot;--are an exception co the general rule. We treat types of quanCitles, such as distance, weight, volume, time  duracioo, etc., as basic conceptual categories.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="4"> Following Hayes \[1979\], unlCs such as feet, pounds, gallons, and hours are considered to be functions from numbers,to quantities. Thus (FEET 3) and (YARDS l) denote the same distance. Halations llke length, weight, size, and duration hold between an entity and a quantity of an appropriate type. Where a word llke &amp;quot;welghc&amp;quot; serves in English to refer co both the relaClon and the quantity, we must be careful Co dlsClngulsh between chem. To see the dlscincCion, note Chac length, beam, and draft are all relaclons between a ship and a quanClcy of the same type, discance. We treat comparatives llke &amp;quot;greater than&amp;quot; as molcidomain relaclons, working with any two quanciCles of the same type (or wich pure numbers, for chac matter).</Paragraph>
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