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<Paper uid="P90-1011">
  <Title>and</Title>
  <Section position="6" start_page="86" end_page="87" type="concl">
    <SectionTitle>
8 Conclusion
</SectionTitle>
    <Paragraph position="0"> Requesting works well as a performative verb because requesting requires only that the agent has made an attempt, and need not have succeeded in getting the hearer to do the requested action, or even to form the right beliefs. Some verbs cannot be used performatively, such as &amp;quot;frighten,&amp;quot; because they require something beyond a mere attempt. Hence, such verbs would name action expressions that required a particular proposition p be true after the utterance event. When the utterance event does not guarantee such a p, the use of the performative verb will not be possible.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="1"> On the other hand, certain utterances (performative or not), when performed by the right people in the right circumstances, make certain institutional facts hold. So, when a clergyman, judge, or ship captain says &amp;quot;I now pronounce you husband and wife,&amp;quot; the man and woman in question are married. In our framework, there would be a domain axiom whose antecedent characterizes the circumstances, participants, and nature of the utterance event, and whose consequent asserts that an institutional fact is true. The axiom is justified not by the nature of rational action, but by the existence of an institution. Such utterances could be  made with a performative prefix provided such attempts are made into successes by the institution.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="2"> This paper has shown that treating performative utterances as declarative sentences is a viable analysis, in spite of Searle's criticisms. The performative use of an illocutionary verb is selfguaranteeing when the named illocutionary act consists in the speaker's making an attempt to make public his mental state. In such cases, if the speaker thinks he has done so, then he has.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="3"> However, we do not derive the named illocutionary act from the assertion, nor vice-versa. Instead, both derivations may be made from the utterance event, but the assertive one is in fact harder to obtain as it has extra conditions that need to be satisfied.</Paragraph>
  </Section>
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