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<Paper uid="C69-7001">
  <Title>DISCOURSE REFERENTS ~</Title>
  <Section position="3" start_page="0" end_page="0" type="intro">
    <SectionTitle>
2. Specificity
</SectionTitle>
    <Paragraph position="0"> Let us now return to the problem of specificity that was First introduced in SS 1.1. As we already pointed out, many of the examples above that were judged anomalous in the intended sense can also be given another interpretation that makes them perfectly acceptable.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="1">  Although 'non-specific' indeFinites do not permit eoreFerence in (88), there is nothing wrong with these examples provided that the indefi- null nite NP is understood 'specifically'.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="2"> (88) (a) Bill didn't find a misprint. Can you Find it? (b) John wants to catch a fish. You can see the fish  from here.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="3"> How should we represent this distinction? As the terms 'specific' and 'non-specific' imply, transformational grammarians have traditionally assumed that there is a feature \[+specific\], just as there is a feature F+deFinite\], and that indefinite NPs are to be marked with respect to specificity. Let us call this view, that goes together with Chomsky's original proposal that CorePSerence be marked with integer--type indices, the classical theory. There is also another approach to these, problems suggested by Emmon Bach (1968), James O. McOawley (1967), George l_akoPS-PS, and others. The essential feature ol = their proposals is that referential indices are variables, bound by quantifiers that act like quantifiers in symbolic logic. What corresponds to the indefinite - Z6 article is, of course, something very similar to the existential quantifier in predicate calculus. (Bach calls it 'the some operator'.) Base structures resemble formulas in symbolic logic. This approach to syntax has now become known as 'generative semantics'.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="4"> It is easy to see that in the framework of generative semantics e there is no justification nor need for a feature such as \[+specific\]. The ambiguities in question ape naturally accounted fop by the fact that the quantifier binding variable that underlies some indefinite noun phrase may be placed in different positions in the base structure. Specificity thus becomes a ITiEtter of the scope of quantifie rs.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="5"> As far as the problems discussed in this paper ape relevant to choosing a theoPetical framework~ they seem to argue in favor of adopting the Bach-McOawle~ proposals, It is rather difficult to see, how one could achieve an adequate description of the facts in the classical theory, FoP example~ consider the following case. Both  (39a) and (39b) are ambiguous with respect to specificity.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="6"> (39) (a) Bill intends to visit a museum.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="7"> (b) Bill visits a museum every day.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="8">  In the tspecifict sense~ both examples establish a discouPse referent. q It would make perfect sense to continue with a descP~:~tion of lthe museum Bill intends to visit t or fthe museum Bill visits every day'. - 27-In the 'non-specific' sense, there is no such museum at all. So far so good, we can say that the NP a museum can be r+specific\]. But what about example (40)? (40) Bill intends to visit a museum every day.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="9"> It is clear that (40) is ambiguous in many ways. For example, the quantified time adverb every day could be assigned either to the complement or to the main clause, let us now consider only the For- null mer case. The remaining ambiguities should be attributable to the indefinite NP a museum, in Fact, we should have a two--way ambiguity between the specific and nort-specific interpretation. But example (40) is stilt ambiguous in more than two ways. It could be interpreted to mean (41a)~ (41b), or (41c).</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="10"> (41) (a) 'There is a certain museum that Bill intends to visit every day. ' (b) 'Bill intends that there be some museum that he visits every day. ' (c) 'Bill intends to do a museum visit every day. '  It is easy to see why this happens. What the feature F+-specific\] accomplishes in case of (39a) is that it clarifies the relation between the indefinite NP a museum and the verb intend in the main sentence: Is Bill's intention about some particular museum or not? In (39b), we employed the same device to characterize the relation between - Z8.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="11"> the quantified time adverb~ and the indefinite noun phrase: Is it the same museum every day or not? To do the work in (40) we would need two features~ one to characterize the relation between intend anda museum, another for the relation between a museum and every day. Under the interpretation (4\]b), for exampte, _a museum would be non-specific with respect to the verb intend but specific with respect to the quantified time expr-ession. But to say that there are several varieties of specificity is a way of saying that there is no feature r+specific\] at alt. The ctassicat theory clearly is not sufficient to account for the multiple meanings of (40).5 On the other hand, in the Bach-McOawtey framework we are able to account for the ambiguities in a straight-for~Nard way. The three senses of (40) discussed above might be represented roughly as in (42). 6  (42) (a) (~ x)r museum(x), intend(Bitt, (every day)visit(Bitt, x))\] (b) intend(Bitt, (~x)r museum(x). (every day)vtsit(Bilt, x)\]) (c) intend(Bill, (every dayX~x)\[ museum(x), visit(Bill, x)\])  Another advantage of generative semantics is that there is an explanation ready for the fact that (40) establishes a discourse referent under only one of the three interpretations we have considered, narnely (42a). I The rule is that an indefinite NP establishes a permanent referent just in case the proposition to which the binding quantifier is attached is - 29assumed (asserted, implied, or presupposed) to be true, provided that the quantifier is not itself in the scope of some higher quantifier. 7 The First part of the rule accounts For the difference between (42a) and (42b-c), the second part is needed to explain why (39b) establishes a permanent referent only under one of the two possible interpretations. Notice that, in (42a), the quantifier underlying the NP a museum is attached to the main proposition. Since the main proposition is asserted to be true and there are no higher quantifiers involved, (2~2a) establishes a referent corresponding to the NP a museum. Now, consider the other two interpretations of (40). The verb intend is one of the modal verbs discussed in (1.21). We know that the complement of a modal verb taken by itself is not implied or presupposed to be true. In (42b) and (42c), the quantifier underlying the NP a museum is attached to the complement. Therefore~ the above rule correctly predicts that no referent corresponding to a m museum is established under these two interpretations.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="12"> From the point of view of a text interpreting device, the classical theory has tittle to recommend itself. The problems studied above clearly argue in Favor of the Bach-McOawtey framework, in processing a sentence, a text interpreter apparently has to associate an indefinite NP with a variable and attach the binding quantifier to some sentence above the NP using whatever clues there are present to - 30assign the scope with as little ambiguity as possible. Clues that reduce scope ambiguity include the presence of an appositive relative clause or of special words such as &amp;quot;certain&amp;quot;~ &amp;quot;single&amp;quot;~ and &amp;quot;some&amp;quot; in the noun phrase itself and the surface order of quantifiers~ negation, and articles in the rest of the sentence. Secondly~ the interpreter has to keep track of the truth value of the proposition represented by the sentence to which the quantifier is attached. The following example demonstrates some of the diFFiculties that are involved. Let us start a discourse with (43).</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="13"> (43) Mary may want to mammy a Swede.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="14"> Highly schematicalty~ the underlying structure of (48) is something like (44).</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="15">  (45) (a) 'There is some Swede whom Mary may want to marry. ' (b) 'It may be the case that there is some Swede whom Mary wants to marry, ' (c) 'It may be the case that Mary wants her future  husband to be a Swede. ' Of the three sentences involved, only S l is asserted by the speaker to be a true proposition. The two other sentences, S 2 and S8, are both commanded by a modal verb (may and want), therefore, their&amp;quot; truth is not implied or presupposed. The indefinite NP a Swede establishes a discourse referent just in case its binding quantifier is attached to S 1&amp;quot; This can be demonstrated easily by pointing out that, if the speaker continues the discourse with (46), the preceding sentence (48) can only be understood in the sense of (4.5a).</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="16"> (46) She introduced him to her mother yesterday.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="17"> However, the following continuation, .where the pronoun its' stands for&amp;quot; $2, permits both (4,5a) and (45b).</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="18"> (47) Suppose that it is tr`ue, then she will certainly introduce him to her mother.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="19"> As a final example, after some thought it should be obvious that a disoourse consisting of (48) and (48)~ where the first \[t in (48) stands for S 2 and the second {.t fop S 8 is three ways ambiguous just as (48) - 3Zby itself. Since all three component propositions of (44) are now either asserted or supposed to be true, there is no way of resolving the inherent scope ambiguity by looking at the coPefePentiality of a Swede and him.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="20"> (48) Suppose that it is true and that she does it, then she will certainly introduce him to her mother.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="21"> Although the argument against the traditional fea+-ure \[-+specific\] should leave no doubt about its uselessness in discussing anything but the simplest kind of scope ambiguity, it does not necessarily mean that the familiar terms 'specific' and 'non-specific' should be rejected. They have proved quite useful and no harm is done, provided that they are understood in a relative sense and not as denoting some absolute property inherent in indefinite noun phrases. For example, consider interpretation (45b) of (4.3), which assigns the quantifier to S 2 * One might ,want to say that, with respect to the verb want the indefinite NP a Swede is specific. On the other hand, if the quantifier is attached to $3, as in (45c), a Swede could be called non-specific with respect to want. In general', let us call an indefinite NP specific with respect to a given verb (or quantifier, or negation) if the latter is in the scope of the quantifier associated with the NP. It is non-specific in case the verb commands the quantifier. This kind of definition seems consistent with the way these terms have been used - 33 in recent literature, and there is no reason to stop using them as tong as the relative nature of specificity is understood.</Paragraph>
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