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<Paper uid="C96-1090">
  <Title>Issues in Communication Game</Title>
  <Section position="2" start_page="0" end_page="0" type="intro">
    <SectionTitle>
1 Introduction
</SectionTitle>
    <Paragraph position="0"> Communication is a game (interaction among autonomous agents) by definition. So it can be analyzed in game-theoretic terms} In this paper we study a fundamental aspect of linguistic communication from the point of view of game theory, and enumerate some basic issues involved in the communication games of natural language.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="1"> Let I be the proposition that the sender S intends to communicate a semantic content c to the receiver R. Then I entails that S intends that R should both recognize c and believe I. This is the core of nonnatural meaning (Grice, 1957; Grice, 1969). Grice's original notion of nonnatural meaning further entails (S's intention of) R's believing (when e is a proposition or a reference) or obeying (when it is an order or a request) c, but we disregard this aspect and concentrate on this core.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="2"> This restricted sense of nonnatural meaning implies that communication is inherently collaborative, because both S and R want that R should recognize c and I. S of course wants it, and so  ers, for general reference on game theory.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="3"> such a case S is still intending to communicate a content c by way of making R recognize this intention. Even if R doubts S's honesty, R will try to know what c is, because knowing what e is would help R infer what the hidden intent of S may be, among others. For instance, when S tells R that it is raining, R will learn that S wants to make R believe that it is raining. R would do so even if R knew that it is not raining. Even if R were unsincere and misunderstood S's message on purpose, 2 the nonnatural meaning is still properly conveyed, because otherwise the intended misunderstanding would be impossible.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="4"> The present study concerns this aspect of communication, the nonnatural meaning in the restricted sense, which is a core of intended communication. Lies, ironies, indirect speech acts, and so forth (Perrault, 1990; Perrault and Allen, 1980) all share this core. Our understanding about it will hence help us understand basic workings of natural communication systems. As an example, centering theory (Grosz et al., 1995) could be attributed to game-theoretic accounts, as demonstrated l~ter in this paper.</Paragraph>
  </Section>
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