<?xml version="1.0" standalone="yes"?>
<Paper uid="E85-1014">
  <Title>apos;HOW &amp;quot;/0 RESTRICT AMBIGUITY 0F DIBCOURSE</Title>
  <Section position="3" start_page="94" end_page="96" type="metho">
    <SectionTitle>
NONMONOTONICITY OF THE RULE
</SectionTitle>
    <Paragraph position="0"> zden er%vowalny.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="1"> When ~)I came near Peter Q2 was nervous.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="2"> according to the rule of restricted choice the first interpretaf/on should be preferred. The rule of resfx'icted choice is based on the assumpt/on that whenever it is possible people use unambiguous constructions. Although usually va/id this assumption cannot be regarded as genera@ truth. This meeuns that the rule of restricted choice enables one to jump to plausible but not ironclad conclusions. &amp;quot;l~pically, such conclusions can be invalidated when new information is available. In our example the preferred intezq0retation might he overturned when we extend our discourse as follows: (1.9) I&lt;iedy ~I podszed~ do Piotra, by~ on zdener-vvowany.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="3"> BM~ tc wynik wcze~niejszej k~6tni z Piotrem.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="4"> C/I came near Peter he was When nervous.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="5"> That was the result of an earlier quarrel with Peter.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="6">  The neoessity of changing the preferred interpretation follcws from the fact that new information is available. The property of drawing plausible but defeasible inferences characterizes non-monotonic reasoning. Various forms of this kind of reasoning are now being developed (see (~AI-84)).</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="7"> It is now widely recognized that discourse understanding regulres nonmonotonic mechanisms in many aspects. The rule of restricted choice is an example of such a nonmonotonic tool</Paragraph>
  </Section>
  <Section position="4" start_page="96" end_page="96" type="metho">
    <SectionTitle>
C ONCLUSIONS
</SectionTitle>
    <Paragraph position="0"> (1.) While constructing discourse the speaker wants the hearer to understand him correctly. Even if he uses ambiguous constructions he intends to cemrr, unicate the unique interpretations, and not to create in heater's mind a set of a/l possible hypotheses. It follows that constructhag NLU systems, which ~enerate all admissible interpretations, contradicts common sense reasonln~. So the essential problem is to determine methods o/ choosing the most appropriate interpretation.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="1"> If this plausible interpretation fails, it should be revised.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="2"> (2) Employing the rule of restricted choice assumes the existence of some mechanism which determines whether a given construction can be regarded as a prototype. 'l~bis can be achieved by specifyins a set of rules quali~j'ing the obUgatory coreference and noncoreference of referrins expressions. A partied set of such rules for the l::ollsh language has been presented in (Dunin-K~plicz, 1983).</Paragraph>
  </Section>
  <Section position="5" start_page="96" end_page="96" type="metho">
    <SectionTitle>
ACKNOWLED GEMEN'P
</SectionTitle>
    <Paragraph position="0"> I would llke to thank Dr Witold Lukaszewicz for helping me to clarify ideas presented in this paper.</Paragraph>
  </Section>
class="xml-element"></Paper>