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<Paper uid="T87-1038">
  <Title>Mental Models and Metaphor</Title>
  <Section position="2" start_page="0" end_page="0" type="metho">
    <SectionTitle>
Ancaster, Ontario CANADA LgG 3N6
I. Introduction
</SectionTitle>
    <Paragraph position="0"> This paper investigates the significa,lce of the mental models (MM) hypothesis for computational linguistics in general and for metaphor comprehension in particular. The N~4 hypothesis is the claim &amp;quot;that people understand the world by forming mental models. ''I The general form of this hypothesis is not new: Immanuel Kant and neo-Kantians such as Hans Vaihinger and Ernst Cassirer have argued that there is no direct access to the things-in-themselves. Concepts and conceptualizations mediate between the person and the world.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="1"> Although the general contours of the MM hypothesis have been around for some time, the emphasis on models and domains which one finds in the literature is a more recent phenomenon.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="2"> Let us consider a definition of an N~: A mental model is a cognitive construct that describes a person's understanding of a particular content domain in the world. This contrasts sharply with much other work in cognitive psychology, which attempts to be domain-independent. deg-Donald Norman, for example, investigated calculator usage and found that the models constructed by individuals varied considerably from user to user. 3 If we take the time to find out, we see that individuals do differ in the conceptualizations which they form.</Paragraph>
  </Section>
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