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<Paper uid="C92-1036">
  <Title>SEMANTIC AND PRAGMATIC INTERPRETATION OF JAPANESE SENTENCES WITH DAKE (ONLY)</Title>
  <Section position="3" start_page="0" end_page="0" type="metho">
    <SectionTitle>
2 Differences in Interpretation
of Dake-sentences
</SectionTitle>
    <Paragraph position="0"> It has been observed that there is a certain difference in meaning between the Japanese sentences shown in (1,a) and (1,b), according to the relative positioning of the two particles, dake (only) and de (by). (We will call the first type of sentences de-dake-sentences and tile second type dake-de-sentences for short. We will also call them in general, dake-sentences.)  (1) a. de-dake-sentence: *also at Matsushita Electric Industrial, Co., Ltd. lalso at Wa~eda University Soko-ni-wa zitensya de dake ik-eru.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="1"> tbere-LOC-TOP bike INST only go-can ((1) can get there only by bike.) b. dake-de-sentenee: Soko-ni-wa zitensya dake de ik-eru.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="2"> there-LOt-TOP bike only INST go-can ((I) can get there by bike alone.)  According to Morita\[8\], (1,a) means that &amp;quot;bike is the only means by which I can get there,&amp;quot; i.e. &amp;quot;1 can't get there by any means other than bike?' He called this tile 'absolute restriction' meaning. On the other hand, (1,b) roughly means that &amp;quot;I can get there by bike alone,&amp;quot; i.e. &amp;quot;the minimally necessary means which enables me to get there is by bike.&amp;quot; This be called tlLe 'minimal restriction' meaning. In this case, we have a reading ill which &amp;quot;I call get there by any other means easier than bike.&amp;quot; We can see that there is a similar difference in available readings for the corresponding English sentences, which are shown in (2). While (2,a) has the 'absolute restriction' meaning, (2,b) has the 'minimal restriction' meaning, in Morita's terminology.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="3"> (2) a. 1 can get there only with a bike.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="4"> b. I can get there with only a bike.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="5"> It might be suggested that the difference in the meanings of these sentences are due to the relative positioning of dake and de, in the case of Japanese, and that of only and with, in the case of English, which somehow causes the difference in the semantic scopes of dake or only. But when we look at other examples like (3), in which dake interact with particles other than de, it becomes obvious that the real phenomenon is a bit more complicated.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="6">  (3) a. Sono-koto-wa haha ni (lake i-eru.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="7"> that-thing-Tof mother DAT only tell-can ((1) ca,, tell it only to iny mother.) b. Sono-koto-wa haha dake ni i-eru.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="8"> that-thing-Top mother only DAT tell-can ((I) can tell it to only my mother.)  In (3), we see that ni can either precede or follow dake, as in the ease of de. floweret, the difference ill ACRES DE COLING-92, NANTES, 23-28 Aour 1992 2 1 9 I'ROC. OF COL1NG-92. NANTES, Ax3U. 23-28, 1992 meaning between the two sentences in (3) is not at all clear. This is also true of the English equivalents given above. Both sentences mean that &amp;quot;I can't tell it to any person other than my mother.&amp;quot; These sentences seem to suggest that there is something common to Japanese and English, an interpretive procedure for sentences involving dake and only, which effects in some difference in meaning in the case of pairs of sentences in (1) or in (2), but does not in the case of pairs of sentences in (3).</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="9"> In this paper, we will focus on these sentences and formulate the interpretive procedure which would explain the differences in these interpretations.</Paragraph>
  </Section>
  <Section position="4" start_page="0" end_page="0" type="metho">
    <SectionTitle>
3 Previous Accounts for
</SectionTitle>
    <Paragraph position="0"> Japanese The difference in interpretation between de-dake-sentences and dake-de-sentenees has attracted attentions of Japanese linguists. We will summarize here Morita's\[8\] observations and Kuno's\[5\] generalizations. Morita\[8\] was the first to observe this difference and characterized these sentences as follows.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="1"> Morlta's observations:  (4) a. De-dake means 'absolute (exclusive) restriction'. null b. Dake-de means 'minimal restriction'.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="2"> c. The alternation between dake and particles  other than de doesn't ca use this kind of difference. Each ordering means 'absolute restriction'. null Kuno\[5\] generalized Morita's observations to the ordering of particles in general and ascribed the difference in meaning of de-dake-sentences and dake-de-sentences to the semantic contents of these particles and the order they appear in the sentence. His generalizations can be summarized as in (5).</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="3"> Kuno's generalizations: (5) a. The ordering of particles (particle + quantifier-like particle), such as de-dake, ni-dake, to-dake, de-nomi, de-bakari, etc. means 'absolute (exclusive) restriction'.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="4"> b. The ordering of particles (quantifier-like particle + particl e) such as dake-de, dake-ni, daketo, norai-de, bakarl-de, etc. means 'minimal restriction'. null c. The alternation between dake and particles other than de does cause the difference in meaning, but in some cases, the ordering (quantifierlike particle q- particle) have 'absolute restriction' meaning as a secondary meaning.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="5"> From now on, we will call the ordering of particles (particle + dake), as in de-dake, p(article)-dake, the ordering (dake + particle), dake-p(article). And we will also call sentences with these orderings p.dakesentences and dake-p-sentenees, respectively. One common feature of these two accounts is that they are trying to capture the difference between the two types of sentences in the semantic contents of particular orderings of particles. On that basis, Morita claims that the semantic contents of de-dake and dake-de are different while relative order of dake and particles other than de does not affect the semantic contents of these sentences. Kuno, on the other hand, claims that the semantic contents of p-dake and dake-p are always different, and dake-p has one additional reading in some cases, in which it is equivalent to that ofp-dake. However, sentences like (6) is a straight-forward counterexample to their claims. Here, a dake-de sentence does not have the 'minimal restriction' meaning, although what Kuno meant exactly by 'the minimal restriction meaning' is somewhat unclear.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="6"> (6) Soko-ni-wa zitensya dake de i-tta.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="7"> there-LOt-TOP bike only INST go-PAST ((I) got there by bike alone.) It is clear that the difference in meaning between p-dake-sentences and dake-p-sentences is a difference in the interpretations of the whole of these sentences, not a difference in the semantic contents of the particular part of the sentences.</Paragraph>
    <Paragraph position="8"> In what follows, we will take another careful look at the details of the so-called 'minimal restriction' meaning of dake-p-sentences and try to figure out what kind of interpretive procedure is involved in causing these differences.</Paragraph>
  </Section>
  <Section position="5" start_page="0" end_page="0" type="metho">
    <SectionTitle>
4 Another Look at the Differ-
ences in Interpretation
</SectionTitle>
    <Paragraph position="0"/>
    <Section position="1" start_page="0" end_page="0" type="sub_section">
      <SectionTitle>
4.1 The 'Minimal Restriction' Meaning
</SectionTitle>
      <Paragraph position="0"> as a Composite If we look at the original dake-de-sentenee (1,b) carefully, the intuitive interpretation we obtain is something like &amp;quot;bike provides a sufficient means for getting there, and any other means is not necessary.&amp;quot; Moreover we feel that &amp;quot;I can get there by any other means easier (in some sense) than bike.&amp;quot; Thus, what Kuno and Morita called 'minimal restriction' meaning can be reformulated in terms of the following two statements in (7).</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="1"> 'Minimal restriction' meaning: (7) a. Anything other than X is not necessary. ('necessity' part) b. Anything &amp;quot;bigger&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;more costly&amp;quot; than X will suffice. ('scalar' part) In the case of p-dake sentences, we see that the 'absolute restriction' meaning is a part of its semantic content. For instance, in (8), we cannot utter (8,b) after uttering (8,a). (8,b) is incompatible with the 'absolute restriction' meaning of (8,a). This shows that the 'absolute restriction' meaning of p-dake-sentences is not Ac/~ DE COLING-92, NANTES, 23-28 Ao'\]r 1992 2 2 0 PROC, OF COLING-92, Nhgrl~s, AUG. 23-28, 1992 defensible, so it is a part of semantic contents of dedake-scntenees. null  (8) a. Soko-ni-wa zitensya de dake ik-eru.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="2"> there-LOC~TOP bike INST only go-can ((f) can get there only by bike.) b. ??Zidoosya de rno ik-eru.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="3"> car INST tOO go-can ((I) can get (there) by car, too.) But how about the 'minimal restriction' meaning of dake-p-sentenees? A similar test can be applied. In the following examples, uttering (10,b) after uttering (9) is weird, whereas uttering (10,a) or (10,c) after (9) is not strange at all.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="4"> (9) Sokoni-wa zitensya duke de ik-eru.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="5"> there-LOC-ToPbike only INST go-can ((I) can get there by bike alone.) (10) a. Zidoosya de mo ik-eru.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="6"> car INST too go-can ((I) can get (there) by .... too.) b. ??Zidoosya mo hituyoc~da.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="7"> car too necessary-is (A car is necessary, too.) c. Zidoosya de wa ik-c-nai.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="8"> car INST TOP go-can-not ((I)  can't get (there) by car,) This shows that the 'necessity' part of the 'minimal restriction' meaning of dake-p~sentenees is not defensible, and is an inherent part of the semantic content, whereas the 'scalar part' is defeasihle, a kind of conversational implicature.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="9"> Given these observations, we propose tile following hypotheses in order to explain the differences in interpretation betwecn p-dake-sentenees and dake-psentences. null Hypotheses: (A) While p-dake-sentences always have the 'absolute restriction' meaning as a part of their semantic contents, dake-p-sentences do not bave it in some cases. (These two types of sentences have a difference in their semantics in this respect.) (B) Dake-p sentences have the meaning that anything other than the thing in question is not necessary ('necessity' part of the 'minimal restriction' meaning), as a part of their semantic contents, depending on their contexts.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="10"> (C) We can get the 'scalar' part of the 'minimal restriction' meaning from dake-p~sentences in somc contexts.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="11"> (D) This meaning of duke-p-sentences can be seen ms a kind of eonvcrsational implicature obtained through some pragmatic inference of the hearer. (A) and (B) above are concerned with the semantics, while (C) and (D) are concerned with the pragmatics. In tile remainder of this paper, we will concentrate on Japanese examples, but we believe that a similar if not identical, processes are involved in the interpretation of English counterparts.</Paragraph>
    </Section>
    <Section position="2" start_page="0" end_page="0" type="sub_section">
      <SectionTitle>
4.2 Further Observations
</SectionTitle>
      <Paragraph position="0"> Given the hypotheses (A)-iD) that explains the differences in available readings between p-duke-sentences and duke-p-sentences, the following questions have to be raiscd.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="1"> * With regard to (A) and (B), what are the contexts where duke-p-sentences do not have 'absolute restriction' meaning, and in what contexts do they have the 'necessity' part as their semantic contents, and how? * With regard to (C) and (D), in what contexts do dake-p-sentences get the 'scalar' part, and how? In (6) we saw an example where dake-p-sentences do not have the 'minimal restriction' meaning. In other words, (6) have neither the 'necessity' part nor the 'scalar' part. flere are some other examples.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="2">  (11) a. Sokoni-wa zitensya de duke there-Toy bike INST only i-tta-koto-ga-aru.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="3"> go-PAST-that-NO M-exlst ((I) have been there only by bike.) b. $okoni-wa zitenaya duke de there-TOP bike only INST i-tta-koto~ga~aru.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="4"> go-PhST-that-NoM-exist ((I) have been there by bike alone.) (ll,a) means that &amp;quot;I haven't been there by any means  other than bike,&amp;quot; that is, it has the 'absolute restriction' meaning, and ill,b) clearly does not have the 'absolute restriction' meaning. Although this difference in meam ing between these two sentences is clear, ill,b) does not have the 'minimal restriction' meaning. That is, this sentence have neither the 'necessity part' nor the 'scalar part' of the 'minimal restriction' meaning. But there are other examples in which we can get the 'necessity part' and 'scalar part' of the 'minimal restriction' meaning, as in (12).</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="5">  Even among sentences involving dake and de, there are differences in available interpretations. The only difference among these sentences lies in the properties of their predicates. We see that the 'minimal restriction' meaning for dake-p-sentences is obtained only when the predicates involved express some &amp;quot;possibility,&amp;quot; such as ik-eru (can go) or naoru (can be cured).</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="6"> Taking into account examples that involve dake along with particles other than de, we notice that things get further complicated. We have already seen in (3) that in sentences involving dake and ni, we can get neither the 'necessity' part nor the 'scalar' part of the 'minimal restriction' meaning for a dake-ni-sentence, even when we use a &amp;quot;possible&amp;quot; predicate. When we do not use a &amp;quot;possible&amp;quot; predicate, we can't get the 'minimal restriction' meaning for dake-ni-sentences either, as shown in (13).</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="7">  (13) a. Kazoku ni dake siraseru.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="8"> family DAT only inform ((1) will inform (it) only to my family.) b. Kazoku dake ni siraseru.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="9">  family only DAT inform ((I) will inform (it) to only my family.) From these observations, we have at least partial answers to the two questions we raised at the beginning of this section. As for the first question, we can say that when dake-p-sentenees involve certain predicates like 'ikeru', 'itta-koto-ga-aru', the 'absolute restriction' meaning tends to disappear. Moreover, when they involve de and &amp;quot;possible&amp;quot; predicates, they have the 'necessity' part as their semantic contents. For the second question, we would say that when dake-p-sentences involve de and &amp;quot;possible&amp;quot; predicates, they also have the 'scalar' part as their conversational implicature. When they involve de but not &amp;quot;possible&amp;quot; predicates, they neither have the 'necessity' part nor the 'scalar' part of the 'minimal restriction' meaning.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="10"> These answers suggest that each part of the 'minimal restriction' meaning is tightly related, and, the particle de and &amp;quot;possible&amp;quot; predicates both play crucial roles in this phenomenon.</Paragraph>
    </Section>
  </Section>
  <Section position="6" start_page="0" end_page="0" type="metho">
    <SectionTitle>
5 The Interpretive Procedure
</SectionTitle>
    <Paragraph position="0"/>
    <Section position="1" start_page="0" end_page="0" type="sub_section">
      <SectionTitle>
for Dake-sentences
5.1 De and &amp;quot;Possible&amp;quot; Context
</SectionTitle>
      <Paragraph position="0"> In the previous section, we observed that de-phrases and &amp;quot;possible&amp;quot; predicates are crucial to the difference in meaning between p-dake-sentences and dakep-sentences. Then what is going on when de-phrases and &amp;quot;possible&amp;quot; predicates interact with each other? In order to see this, first consider what happens when we omit dake from (1) as shown in (14).</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="1">  We can get this conditional interpretation only when the sentence has a &amp;quot;possible&amp;quot; predicate as well as a de-phrase. As sentences in (16) and (17) show, this kind of interpretation for sentences with a de-phrase is unavailable when we do not have a &amp;quot;possible&amp;quot; predicate.  (16) Zitensya de iki-tai.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="2"> bike INST go-want ((i) want to go (there) by bike.) (17) Zitensya de iku-bekida.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="3"> bike INST go-should ((You) should go (there) by bike.)  Similarly, if there is no de-phrase, we do not get the conditional interpretation even when we have a &amp;quot;possible&amp;quot; predicate, as the following examples demonstrate.  (18) Zitensya o ka-eru.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="4"> bike Ace buy-can ((I) can buy a bike.) (19) Tookyo kara okur-eru.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="5"> Tokyo from send-can ((I) can send (it) from Tokyo.) (20) Taroo ni a-eru.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="6"> Taroo DAT nleet-ean ((I) can meet with Taroo.)  When de-phrases and &amp;quot;possible&amp;quot; predicates interact, the conditional interpretation becomes available. Note, incidentally, that in English too, similar observations can be made. Consider the English equivalent to (14), shown in (21). This sentence can be interpreted as synonymous with a conditional sentence in (22). (21) I can get there with a bike.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="7"> (22) If I use a bike, I can get there.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="8"> Stump\[10\] discusses this kind of interaction between &amp;quot;possible&amp;quot; predicates and free adjuncts. His main concern is how free adjuncts behave in modal contexts, and the typical examples he considers are shown in (23) arid (24).</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="9">  (23) a. Wearing that new outfit, Bill would fool everyone. null b. If he wore that new outfit, Bill would fool everyone. null (24) a. Standing on a chair, John can touch the ceiling. ACTES DE COLING-92, NANTES, 23-28 aOt~T 1992 2 2 2 PROC. oF COLING-92, NANTES, AUG. 23-28, 1992 b. If he stands on a chair, John can touch the  ceiling.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="10"> According to his observati ..... (23,a) and (24,a) are interpreted as their corresl/onding conditional sentences in (23,b) and (24,b). Ills proposal is that this kind of conditional interpretation for free adjuncts becomes available within semantics of modals. Free adjm,cts would be assingcd the same semantic type as conditional clauses, and so the conditional interpretation derives entirely from the semantic rules necessary for the interpretation of modals.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="11"> lie uses Kratzer's\[3\] formalization for the semantic rules for modals; the semantic contents of (23) and (24) are expressed as follows.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="13"> Kratzer uses a possible world semantics, and a simple way to read these formulae is to understaud that D is some function which maps the conversational hackground, cb, and the antecedent proposition to some possible worlds nearest to the current world, and tbat would' and can ~ are truth-functionally relating these worlds to the worlds where the consequent proposition holds. Since our main concern here is tire interaction of the conditional irrterpretation arid dake in p-dake-sentences and asks-p-sentences, we will not go into the details of her analysis. It would suffice for us to express the relevant semantic contents in the following way. (In each case, ~woula, and ~can express the modalized corrditional operator in Kratzer's sense whicb implic.itly incorporates the conversational background, cb.) (27) (Bill wears that new outfit) ---~o,~d (Bill fools everyone) (28) (John stands on a chair) ~, (John touches the ceiling) Since with-pirrases in English behave semantically as free adjuncts, we can get the conditional interprets..</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="14"> tion for tim English sentence (21) from the semantics of &amp;quot;possible&amp;quot; predicates. The semantic content can be expressed ms in (29).</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="15"> (29) (1 use a bike) --%~, (I get there) Assuming that de-phrases in Japanese behave semam tically like free adjuncts in English, we can get the conditional interpretation for (14) fully from the semantics of &amp;quot;possible&amp;quot; predicates in a similar way. The semantic content would roughly be the same as (29).</Paragraph>
    </Section>
    <Section position="2" start_page="0" end_page="0" type="sub_section">
      <SectionTitle>
5.2 Interaction of dake, de, and &amp;quot;Possi-
ble&amp;quot; Contexts
</SectionTitle>
      <Paragraph position="0"> Now we have come to a place where we can resolve tire problems about the difference in meaning between p-dake-sentences and dake-p-sentences. But to do so, first we have to take a further look into the nature of dake.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="1"> 5.2.1 Only as a \]~bcusing Operator There has been a fair amount of work on the semantics of only. Tim basic semantic content of Japanese dake is presumably ahnost the same as English only.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="2"> Only is said to be a focusing operator\[Ill. This is because the truth condition of tire sentences with only depends on so-called focus, as shown in (30). (Focus elements are written in capital letters.) (30) a, John only introduced BILl, to Sue = John introduced only Bill to Sue h. John only introduced Bill to SUE = John i:rtroduced Bill to only Sue Each of these sentences can be paraphrased as the sentences below them, which succinctly show the difference in their truth conditions.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="3"> The traditional treatment for this fact is provided by formulating the semantic contents of only as a binary function which maps its focus element and scope element to something of the appropriate type. The logicM form of these sentences can be written in the following way.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="4"> (31) a. only(Bill)(Ax\[John introduced x to Sue\]) b .... ly(Sne)(Ax\[Jotm introduced Bill to x\]) In these formulae, the first argument is the focas of only, and tim second argmnent is its scope. When you supply the appropriate lntensional Logic translation to this function only, the equivalent Intensional Logic expressions for them results, as shown in (32).</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="5"> (32) a. Vx\[introduced'(j', ~, s') -~ x = b'\] b. Vx\[introduced'(j', b', x) ~ x = s'\] There are problems with this kind of naive approach. See Rooth\[9\] arid yon Stechow\[ll\] for some criticisms and possible extensions. Ilere, however, we will simply assume that dake imnmdiately follows its focus element.  How much of the difference in meaning between p-dake-sentences and dflke-/~sentences can we account for in the semantics? From the discussions we gave in tim last section, we can obtain the conditional interpretation as their semantic contents.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="6"> A similar paraphrase for (1) will work. tlere again, we can paraphrase the sentences into sonmthing like  One possible way we can think of (33,a) is that duke takes entire de phrase as its focus and takes the whole sentence as its scope. Then its logical form can be expressed as in (34).</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="7"> (34) only((I use a bike))(2P(P --*can (I get the re))) This can be translated into (35).</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="8"> (35). VP\[\[P &amp;quot;-*ca, (I get there)\] ~ P = (I use a bike)\] In (34), duke takes its scope over the whole modalized conditional interpretation, restricting antecedent condition for enabling me to get there only to &amp;quot;using a bike.&amp;quot; This expresses the 'absolute restriction' meaning correctly. Since there is no such condition other than using a bike which enables me to get there, /can't get there without a bike.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="9"> As for (33,b), its focus is clearly the NP ziiensya and its scope is the whole antecedent sentence. Thus we obtain (36), and its translation (37).</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="10"> (36) only((a bike))()~z(I use x)) &amp;quot;-+con (I g et there) (37) (I use a bike)AVy\[(I use y)---* y = bike\] &amp;quot;-'%an (I get there) This time, dake takes scope over the de-phrase, whose semantic content is roughly &amp;quot;using a bike&amp;quot;, and excludes any other means of transportation. The semantic contents of the whole sentence would be something like, &amp;quot;if I use a bike and do not use any other means, I can get there.&amp;quot; In other words, &amp;quot;it is sufficient for getting there that I use a bike and do not use any other means.&amp;quot; This means that &amp;quot;it is not necessary for getting there that I use any means other than bike&amp;quot;, which is exactly the 'necessity part' of the 'minimal restriction' meaning.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="11"> In this way, 'how' part of the first question we raised in 4.2 is solved. Although (B) is stating an assumption for duke-p-sentences in general, there is only one case where dake-l~sentences have the 'necessity' part of the 'minimal restriction' meaning, that is the case where such sentences have de-phrases and &amp;quot;possible&amp;quot; predicates. In such cases, these sentences can get conditional interpretations due to those two independent facts.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="12"> * De-phrases act like free adjuncts in English.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="13"> * Free adjuncts in &amp;quot;possible&amp;quot; context can receive conditional interpretations by the semantic nature of &amp;quot;possible&amp;quot; predicates.</Paragraph>
    </Section>
    <Section position="3" start_page="0" end_page="0" type="sub_section">
      <SectionTitle>
5.3 Conversational Implicature of Duke-
</SectionTitle>
      <Paragraph position="0"> sentences The remaining question is 'how' part of the second question in 4.2. We can restate the question as follows: * How can the 'scalar' part of the 'minimal restriction' meaning be derived conversationally? For this question, we observed in 4.2 that the 'scalar' part can be obtained when de-phrases and &amp;quot;possible&amp;quot; predicates interact. We saw in 5.1 that when de-phrases and &amp;quot;possible&amp;quot; predicates interact, we can get conditional interpretations. These facts suggest that the conditional interpretations of duke.de-sentences are somehow related to the 'scalar' implicature. Let us consider the original duke-de-sentence, again shown here.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="1"> (1) b. Soko-ni-wa zitensya duke de ik-eru.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="2"> there-Loc-TOP bike only INST ~. go-can ((I) can get there by bike alone.) To get the 'scalar' implicature, we have to have some contextually salient scale. Often, certain specific linguistic expressions, such as (some, all), (bad, good), or numerals provides such scales, and 'generalized scalar implicature' is derived\[6\]. But in the particular case we are considering, the 'scalar' implicature is clearly contextually dependent, i.e., the scale have to be supplied by the context.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="3"> Basically, almost all utterances can have the 'scalar' implicature when they are placed in appropriate contexts. But how easily we can think of the appropriate scale varies. For (1,b) and its conditional interpretation, we can think of such scale rather easily, i.e., the scale in relative easiness of various means for getting there. For example, bike is easier than walking, car is easier than bike, and airplane is easier than car, etc. But you call think of a context where this easiness changes the direction, i.e. bike is easier than car, and car is easier than airplane, etc. So the scale itself is totally context dependent. The important point is that this scale of easiness can be set based on the conditional interpretation of (1,b). We have an inference pattern according to its conditional interpretation shown in (38).</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="4"> (I use a bike) &amp;quot;--*e~n (I get there) (38) (I use a car) .... (I get there) (I use an airplane) --~ean (I get there) This means that the inference pattern of this kind can be made salient by the conditional interpretation of (1,b). That's why the 'scalar' part of the 'minimal restriction' meaning comes with its 'necessity' part. These parts are independently derived from its conditional interpretation. The former is obtained semantically, the latter pragmatically.</Paragraph>
    </Section>
    <Section position="4" start_page="0" end_page="0" type="sub_section">
      <SectionTitle>
5.4 The Interpretive Procedure: The
Whole Picture
</SectionTitle>
      <Paragraph position="0"> The preceding sections have given an overall picture of the procedure for the interpretations of sentences involving duke. We believe that our account is more effective and exhaustive than previous ones.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="1"> First, for p-duke-sentences, we get the 'absolute restriction' meaning in their semantics, taking the scope of duke over the whole sentence. For de-duke-sentences in particular, we get the 'absolute restriction' meaning of modalized conditional swhen they have &amp;quot;possible&amp;quot; predicates.</Paragraph>
      <Paragraph position="2"> Second, for duke-p-sentences, we get the different semantic contents from their corresponding p-duke-sentences when certain predicates are involved, due to AcrEs DE COLING-92, NANTES, 23-28 Aotrr 1992 2 2 4 PROC. OF COLING-92. NANTES, AUG. 23-28, 1992 the fact that dake takes scopes over their postpositional phrases. Then for dake-de-sentences with &amp;quot;possible&amp;quot; predicates, we get the conditional interpretation and the 'necessity' part of the 'minimal restriction' meaning in their semantics, in addition, the 'scalar' implicature can be obtained based on a context-dependent scale which is set by their conditional interpretations.</Paragraph>
    </Section>
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